In September 2016, just before that year’s United States presidential election, The Claremont Review of Books published an essay that became an instant classic. It was titled “The Flight 93 Election”, and its message was stark. If voters didn’t rush the cockpit and come out for Donald Trump in numbers, then traditional values and American interests would be flown into the ground. “If you don’t try, death is certain”, was its rallying cry.

Why were conservatives so scared? Their panic reflected a real insight: for decades, liberalism — its moral values and sensibilities — had been gaining traction in American (and, more broadly, Western) culture. The worry wasn’t so much about liberalism taking over politics. On paper, at least, and despite gross and systemic failures, the United States has always been a constitutional liberal democracy. The problem was the slow and steady creep of liberal values into areas of life completely remote from politics. As a prominent conservative scholar put it:

“Liberalism is thus not merely, as is often portrayed, a narrowly political project of constitutional government and juridical defence of rights. Rather, it seeks to transform all of human life and the world.”

I’m a liberal and I believe conservatives are absolutely right on this point. Liberalism is hegemonic and liberals are the hegemons of the Western world. But that hegemony won’t last if we keep carrying on as we are.

If I had to sum up the 2024 election in a headline, it would be: “This Just In: Actually Existing Liberalism Sucks”. Liberalism is an ideology rooted in a core moral concept — fairness. It’s easy to lose sight of how extraordinary liberalism is. It teaches every single one of its members that they matter, and that every citizen, you and me included, has a legitimate expectation to be treated reasonably and fairly by the basic institutions of society. Fairness and reciprocity for all are the radical moral adventure of liberalism, and I believe it is a beautiful ideal capable of inspiring the enduring support of large majorities.

The trouble is that liberals in most liberal democracies — maybe even especially in the United States — do two things that almost seem designed to inspire resentment: they fail to take inequality seriously, and they moralise.

Consider how many times we heard the term “vibecession” in the run-up to the election. It played nonstop in The New York Times, essentially gaslighting the American public into believing that the cost of living was in their heads or, at worst, a thing of the past. But as Bernie Sanders posted on X, and reiterated in a justifiably prickly post-election podcast with the Times, “It should come as no great surprise that a Democratic Party which has abandoned working-class people would find that the working class has abandoned them.”

History has much to teach us on this point. Late in life, Alexis de Tocqueville — the greatest booster of American democracy — wrote an extraordinary post-mortem on the collapse of a social and political order called The Ancien Régime and the Revolution (1856). His key insight is especially relevant today: a regime is doomed the moment it begins to be hated on a micro-level, when grievances become embedded in the interactions and practices of everyday life. “F**k you”, the average person might think when eggs cost twice as much, or “Jesus Christ!” when the inspection line for a sub-par two-bedroom apartment stretches around the block.

The United States is not unique in this respect. In fact, every single government in the Western democratic world that has faced an election recently has been replaced — whether they’ve switched from liberal to conservative or conservative to liberal. But liberalism, which prides itself on fairness and equal opportunity, is especially vulnerable to this kind of resentment when it falls short of its promises.

Which brings me to the second point of liberal folly: we moralise. Once again, let me pick on the standard bearer of correct liberal opinion, The New York Times. In the two weeks following the election — though, honestly, I could have picked any week within the past ten years — it ran two opinion pieces, one from the right and one from the left wings of its liberal factions, that exemplify the problem rather than the solution. From the right, David French argues that Trump’s 2025 administration is already poised to implode under the weight of its own incompetence and corruption. From the left, Roxane Gay declares a moral imperative to reject the Republican worldview entirely, writing, “We must refuse to participate in a mass delusion”.

Come on. Liberals just got their asses handed to them two weeks ago. Our first impulse cannot be to scold and denounce — that’s exactly why liberals are hated. We can be snobs, and snobbery is one of the worst traits imaginable. It’s a particular kind of pleasure rooted in making inequality felt and hurt. If that’s the only solace liberals can offer themselves right now, we’re in serious trouble. The cockpit liberals need to rush isn’t the wider electorate but an elite orthodoxy that insists it has all the practical and moral answers.

What should liberals do? First, we need to chill. Liberalism remains culturally and politically hegemonic in the West, and Rome wasn’t destroyed in a day. Second, we need to pivot. People will, of course, have different opinions about the way forward. But if I could issue a categorical imperative for liberals, it would be this: keep striving for a country built for everyone, and don’t talk down to those who think differently. Third, we need to listen. To tip my own hand, the best proposal I’ve heard for how liberals should regroup comes from Sohrab Ahmari — himself no friend of liberalism — in a post on X. Here it is in full:

“Imagine a left without the freaky pronoun brigade; that’s reasonably restrictionist on the border (where most voters are); that backs policing and caters to sociality instead of the antisocial; but at the same time is populist on the economy. That’s … pretty attractive.”

That sounds like Trumpism, some would say. I think not, but this isn’t the place to make my case.

The point is that liberals must stop retreating into smugness and start confronting the realities that have alienated so many. Liberalism’s promise of fairness is worth fighting for, but only if we’re willing to embody it, not just preach it.

If we want to hold onto this hegemony of ours, we need to act like it’s worth saving. And that means changing — fast.

This article was originally published by ABC Religion and Ethics.

Image by Andreas Praefcke.

Work hard, play by the rules and you will have a successful and good life. Or so we’re told. Trump’s recent Presidential victory says a lot about how democracy has failed us.

It’s been a few days since it was announced that Donald Trump would be returning to the Oval Office after winning a decisive victory against Vice President Kamala Harris, and it already feels like 2016 again. Like then, many people are straining to make sense of how a man they deem to be morally bankrupt could have secured the votes of over 72 million Americans. 

There will likely be pools of ink spilt attempting to explain the political and economic factors that returned Trump to the White House. But I want to view this moment through a broader moral lens. Because, while Trump’s first victory in 2016 might have been interpreted as a freak event, where a political outsider disrupted an otherwise healthy and functional democratic society, his second decisive victory suggests there’s something deeper and more pervasive at work – a failure that persists at the core of democratic society that Trump was able to exploit. 

The Grand Bargain

Go to school, behave yourself, study hard, get a job (any job), work hard, pay your taxes and play by the rules. If you do all this, then society will ensure that you will be a success and enjoy a good life. 

That’s what I call the ‘Grand Bargain’ of modern liberal democratic society. It goes by different names, with a different spin, in every democracy through terms like the “American Dream” or the “Great Australian Dream”. But it goes beyond just the idea that opportunity is open to all or that home ownership is a natural step towards financial security. It’s like an implicit agreement between the state and the individual: play by the rules and everything will be OK. 

However, many people in ‘rich’ countries are not OK. I barely need to mention inflation, the rising cost of living, stagnant wages, unaffordable housing, exorbitant rent, the offshoring of jobs, the rise of insecure gig work, the closure of traditional industries and manufacturing, not to mention the fact that corporate profits are skyrocketing and the top 10% are doing better than ever. The Grand Bargain has been under pressure since the 1990s and, arguably, it’s been broken ever since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009. 

And people are angry. This is not just because the failure of the Grand Bargain has resulted in real material disadvantage, but the anger has a moral dimension due to a deep sense of injustice at the failure of the state – especially politically and economically – to live up to its end of the Bargain.

Injustice breeds outrage, and outrage is a moral emotion that creates a desire to punish the perceived wrongdoer. In this case, the perceived wrongdoers are the political ‘elites’ who have been instrumental in promoting economic growth at the expense of the workers within that economy. In most modern liberal democracies, those elites include members of both the Left and the Right, especially since the neoliberal turn of the 1990s. So, over the last two decades, no matter who people vote for, the Grand Bargain has remained broken. 

It doesn’t matter that Trump is part of this elite political class. It doesn’t matter that his policies are little more than a basket of fantasies that will almost certainly worsen the economic circumstances of most of those who voted for him while enriching the super rich even more.

What matters is that Trump has effectively given voice to those who feel that the Grand Bargain has failed, and that it’s politics-as-usual that has let them down.

And what Kamala Harris represented – as did Hillary Clinton before her – was politics-as-usual: a kind of politics that tinkered around the edges by providing small perks to certain groups to offset the huge systemic disadvantages they faced. Meanwhile, they were afraid to enact systemic change because that would require facing off against the powerful vested interests who continue to benefit from the current economic paradigm. 

Identity crisis

But this is not the full picture. The Grand Bargain isn’t just about economics, it’s also about identity. In order to live a good life, we need more than just material prosperity, we also need to have our identity recognised and to experience a sense of pride. 

Whether justified or not, large segments of the population in many liberal democracies have felt that their identity has been under attack. Neoliberal policies have taken away the work that gave them a source of meaning and pride in their lives. Multiculturalism has fragmented their communities, eroding social capital and leaving them feeling unmoored in their own neighbourhoods. 

The recent historical reckoning over colonialism and racism has contributed to a narrative of shame directed at the beneficiaries of systemic discrimination, particularly white people. Similarly, the historical reckoning over sexism has promoted a narrative that many men feel has disempowered them and challenged a core feature of their identity. 

I hasten to add that there is much that modern liberal societies must reckon with. But what’s of importance here is how that reckoning has been perceived by many people, especially at a time when their material circumstances have been increasingly precarious. 

Meanwhile, the ‘elites’ – particularly on the progressive side of politics – led these attacks on identity, policing speech and behaviour, and perpetuating a narrative that expressions of pride in one’s heritage or culture, or any expression of concern about diversity, inclusion or the welfare of men was to be perceived as a form of bigotry. As a result, many people changed the way they spoke and behaved in public, but they didn’t change the way they thought.  

Then along comes Trump. He didn’t change the way he spoke or behaved. He said what many people were thinking. He validated the identities of many people who felt under-recognised. He offered a counter-narrative of pride rather than shame. 

Be bold

When you look at Trump’s victory through the moral lens of outrage directed at the failure of the Grand Bargain and at the narratives that cause people to feel shame, then it makes a lot more sense. 

Trump was uniquely positioned to exploit this outrage, to give voice to the indignance that many Americans feel in being ‘left behind,’ and to offer a narrative of ‘greatness’ that promised to restore their pride.  

It doesn’t matter whether his solutions are the right ones to fix the grievances he’s tapping into. What matters is that he validated public outrage at the failure of the Grand Bargain, and he presents himself as strong enough to do something about it even in the face of powerful vested interests (even if he, and his friends, are those vested interests). 

Those who are concerned about the implications of a second Trump presidency, or who lament the rise of populism in democracies around the world, would do well to shift their attention from blaming voters and direct it towards restoring the Grand Bargain. That is not an easy thing to do. It will likely require facing off against powerful vested interests. But through this moment might come avenues to rectify the deeper failures of modern democratic societies and prevent the rise of populists who recognise those failures but whose solutions only make the problems worse, not better. 

If there’s one lesson that Trump has for all politicians, it’s that if boldness and fearlessness coupled with a commitment to promote the interests of one’s supporters can overcome the many political drags that Trump brought to his campaign, imagine what it could to for someone of principle.