Richard Flanagan, author of Heresies, features in a thoughtful studio portrait with a shaved head and a grey trimmed beard

Richard Flanagan: Heresies

Writer Richard Flanagan gazes off-camera wearing a dark jacket in this dimly lit portrait for his book titled Heresies

This is a published extract from Heresies: Occasional Pieces by Richard Flanagan, available 4 August 2026 from Penguin Books.

Many years ago I was a guest at a Slovenian writers festival that culminated in readings in a karst limestone cave. In a remarkable natural amphitheatre there had assembled a large crowd. Many came from local villages and had brought their children along. Several writers read; the last Slovenia’s most revered poet. A short man with a white beard, he somehow filled the vast space and commanded attention.

Bard-like, he recited in Slovene from memory, his voice sonorous, his rhythm musical, more incantation than reading. It was an extraordinary performance. It became apparent that the large crowd was there to hear him and really only him, their Homer. I understood not a word he said but with that crowd felt everything.

The corollary of this experience is Robert Frost’s icy observation that hell is a half-filled auditorium. I was honoured in 2021 to be asked to give the US PEN Arthur Miller Freedom to Write Lecture in New York; less thrilled when as COVID continued to hold us all in varying states of confinement it became clear that I would not be able to give the lecture in person but would have to do it online, beamed from my Tasmanian home to the US. Speaking to a screen on a wintry night is several miles beyond hell. For there is in the strange comity of speaker and a live crowd something that goes to the heart of writing, which, after all, begins in song and chorus. Words have meaning with an audience, while without them all speech is no more than cold draughts, brief breaths here and then gone. And that night I had only the eerie pixelated silence of my laptop, and thinking of how even Homer telling of brave Odysseus’s return to Ithaca might have faltered at such a pass, I was condemned once more to talk into what felt the growing void.

 – 

It is strange to have as my subject ‘freedom to write’, coming from an island which, for a quarter of its modern history, was a slave society. Though there were major differences, the literature of the era abounds with comparisons between the convict society of Van Diemen’s Land and the slave societies of the Americas.

My forebears were transported as convicts from Ireland, frequently in the same ships and similar conditions to those which transported Africans into American slavery, now plying the same trade with a different-coloured cargo and a new destination, where many of the same practices and even administrators of Caribbean slave colonies were deployed.

My island’s founding stigmata has a second wound: the near successful genocide of the Tasmanian Aboriginal population. To this day most Tasmanians are the descendants of the survivors of this twin trauma.

With Conradian exactitude, the war was called at the time a war of extermination. And this exter-mination, as many noted then and later, extended to others—the Tasmanian emu, the Tasmanian tiger—as if it were necessary that some universe of wonder had to be obliterated to cloak the crime. And with it memory was to be extirpated, enforced by silence. Things became unsayable, so many things.

It may be as a species we are defined by our ability to forget, yet freedom exists only in the space of memory.

I was born less than a mile from the plantation my great-great grandfather was sent to work on as a convict labourer. Freedom to write was at the first step a freedom to think, to conceive of oneself as a free being, a thought over a century in forming. The freedom to write is the freedom to say the unsayable; and to say it I had to squeeze the convict blood out of myself drop by drop, word by sentence by book.

In imagining how to do that it was often to African-American writers like Ralph Ellison, James Baldwin and Toni Morrison I turned. I discovered my island in their world, I discovered I belonged both to my small island and to the universe of literature, and I learnt that I could not deny either without denying myself.

To write I had to be free and to be free I had to write. That, for a writer, is the task, the only task.

To be free.

A writer’s freedom is challenged by many things. In my country of Australia the state has ever more repressive laws that significantly encroach on freedom of speech, while as our society grows more unequal the richest and most powerful have the money to leverage grotesque libel laws to silence.

In my country today the practice of journalism is chilled by such acts as our attorney-general suing a reporter and our public broadcaster, when they alleged the anal rape of a minor by a senior unnamed politi-cian. The attorney-general self-identified as the alleged rapist and on that basis instigated his legal action, which experts say has a good chance of success.

But I want to talk today about another aspect of a writer’s freedom.

We are confronted with the title of this lecture by a question masquerading as an unremarkable truth. The freedom to write—but to write what? Because what is at stake—what is always at stake—is finally not being free to write but being free to write the unsayable, the thing not allowed to be said, to tear aside the shrouds of power and wealth and their accompanying conventions and orthodoxies to describe what is.

Because in most places at most times, writers are free to write. We should not forget that tyrannies frequently reserve a higher, more privileged place for writers than democracies, a velvet prison that writers, for the most part, are happy to inhabit.

They are free to write anything they like, as long as what they like to write is what power wants written, and it contents itself with saying the sayable.

And therein lies the rub.

Of the many pernicious fictions writers retail to themselves and, given the chance, to others, perhaps the most ludicrous is that writers wish to write the truth.

Of course nothing is further from the truth than this lie.

Encrusting the lie are comforting nonsenses. One of which writers are fond is that the truth carries all before it. But truth mostly serves only to carry the truth-teller to the abyss personally—and quickly.

Much as they may pretend otherwise, writers, as a rule, are not such fools as to not know this.

The fatal problem of Camus’ Meursault in The Outsider isn’t that he killed another man but that having killed another man he can’t lie about his reasons why—and so he is executed. For telling the truth. This is both moving and comic and therefore deeply moving. It is also profoundly unrealistic.

We all lie about our reasons in order that we might live, and, when the going gets rough, writers and artists generally roll over more quickly than most. William Hazlitt once observed that for every tyrant born so too are a thousand men willing to be enslaved. We might add that of that thousand, a disproportionate number will always be the artists and writers.

And how can it be otherwise? Each of our lives is a war between, on the one hand our need to conform so that we might have shelter, food and security, and on the other the desire of our soul to be free. We understand both are necessary to us but frequently also irreconcilable. Our lives are a walk through the rubble that results, our character the map of our journey.

Another illusion writers have is that they are the voice of their people. This idea has a long history, given glorious tongue by Shelley with his injunction that poets were the unacknowledged legislators of the world. A hundred years later, as nationalism became the new social organising principle, beckoning in a century of horror, Shelley’s post-French Revolution global hopes had somewhat narrowed to Joyce’s declaration that he would ‘forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race’.

Such monomania hides hubris: the unacknowledged legislator ends up purchased by power’s lobbyist while what emerges from the smithy is too often ideology’s apologist.

And for that reason artists and writers are mostly not their people’s heroes or heroines. Mostly they rub along with whatever is the new order, free to write as long as they write in certain ways about certain things. If you’re seeking direction in a corrupted society, the hairdresser and plumber are more likely to serve as moral exemplars than the novelist and playwright.

Klaus Mann, who in 1936 published Mephisto, an instructive novel on this theme, observed a few years earlier as the Nazis’ rise to power became irresistible, how many intellectuals and artists were crossing over to the Nazi side, not because they were sympathetic to the movement, but because that’s where the energy and the future were.

In an essay written in 1999, Roberto Bolaño describes how in Pinochet’s Chile, a young woman with literary ambitions, and her American husband, who worked for the Chilean secret police and perhaps the CIA, had a large house in which upstairs she held literary soirees and downstairs he tortured political prisoners. Bolaño wonders if the writers ‘remember the annoyance of the flickering current that made lamps blink and music stop, interrupting the dancing. Just as surely, they knew nothing about the parallel dance, in which the jab of the prod tensed the tortured back of a knee in a voltaic arc.’

And this, concludes, Bolaño, is how the literature of every country is built.

The word literature—which with Bolaño always carried an ambiguous, even pejorative sense—here means writing that supports the parallel dance of horror, the literature that doesn’t question, the literature of accepted orthodoxies.

In America you have your parallel dancers, as we do in Australia—the Aboriginal people who die in overwhelming numbers in custody, the refugees who we incarcerated in theatres of cruelty on remote Pacific islands. But acknowledging the parallel dancers does not mean immediately writing only about them, for them, of them. To oppose the parallel dance is to oppose the orthodoxies of the age. It is the freedom to write not what we are told but what we experience, and in that realm of experience must be the imagination and its capacious inventions. There must be fancy, the experi-ence that is not authenticated in or by experience. There must be the tearing down of the border walls between I and you, me and us, a breach in the razor wire that separates one soul from the next.

PEN’s noble, necessary work over the best part of a century has been to battle the external constraints that stop a writer writing—and, worse, that imprison and kill writers for what they have written and may yet write.

But we live in a new age.

We need to recognise new forms and new ways of censorship. The inner freedom to write what you think and what you feel, what you know and what you experience, is always hard and is frequently the most difficult battle. But it grows harder.

We live once more in censoring times and what is confusing is that the new censors are not the state or state bodies. They are us.

In the wake of 1989, we wrongly believed that material progress and human freedom were twins, that the former necessarily led to the latter. But as China so stunningly shows, you can have ever more material progress and ever less freedom. And we were blind to the erosion of our own freedom that our material progress and technological triumphs brought in their wake.

For a few short decades we in the west thought we could now expect no censorship. But as we grew more unequal, as we found it within ourselves to see torture as acceptable, the persecution of refugees as necessary, that silence was a precondition of tolerance, we could not see that a corrosion of something fundamental was taking place.

What is acceptable now is not ordered but understood, conveyed by the nuance of new social proscriptions, enforced by a roll call of new profanities, new obscenities, new urgencies, new blasphemies, which we absorb as if by osmosis and call common sense, decency, respect, responsibility.

Writing, though, should never pretend to respect or responsibility. Ever since the man from La Mancha put a toilet bowl on his head and strode out into the world in emulation of higher things, great literature has not been serious about the pieties and verities of its age. It has confronted cant and dogma with the absurdity of existence and laughed, questioning and upending them. Posterity, the blindest of fools, condescends to all who have gone before. Yet Cervantes, like Voltaire, laughed at religious faith and mocked rigidly held beliefs.

Do we?

The new proscriptions arise out of important and necessary social struggles. But in prosecuting causes and politics, writers are sometimes told to stay in their lanes. Writers who offer nuanced positions are attacked as the enemy they are not. Those who fail to observe the new road rules suffer opprobrium, shaming, and sometimes are called on to publicly repent.

Of course, we have always wanted work that flatters our own stupidities. But this human weakness is vastly amplified and empowered by new technologies that are, in the final instance, unaccountable except to the profit and loss spreadsheets of the richest and most powerful corporations in human history.

Many writers are, of course, happy to conform, and in conforming condemn those who won’t conform. They ‘would’, as Seamus Heaney had it about one of his millennia-old bog people, connive/ in civilized outrage yet understand the exact and tribal, intimate revenge.

This too is deeply human.

And yet the exact and tribal, intimate revenge turbocharged by the algorithms of greed should not determine the fate of writers, nor should they be the metric by which writing is judged or created.

A deeper damage is to the idea of writing itself—its capacity and desire for necessary invention, for the necessity of story and fancy, of its ability to encompass worlds to which neither the writer nor reader belong, and yet to which they find themselves profoundly joined.

In this sense the freedom to write is finally not so much a battle with the external forces but with the internal. It becomes a question of what was once called character, or the soul. It would not be presumptuous to call it a spiritual battle.

And in that battle it constantly comes up against the dogmas of conformity.

It is no revelation that nationalism led to many of the great disasters of the twentieth century—and not just in literature. Before the Balkan wars, the Slovenian poet Tomaž Šalamun famously wrote, ‘I got tired of my tribe / and moved out.’ These days, though, writers once again search for a tribe to move in with, as they once did with religion, and then empires, and then nations, and now identity.

This change has deep and profound historical roots and consequences, perhaps the least—but for us the most—that of the great national novel giving way to the great identity novel. But if the tribes change, all tribes still finally demand tribal allegiances to belief and dogma that can leave a writer unfree to write what they believe.

Šalamun’s point of view was, of course, doubly heretical, speaking out against both nationalism and the ruling Titoist ideology of his day.

But it wasn’t without antecedent.

In post-revolutionary Russia, in 1921, the first book to be banned in a pique of tribal dogma was Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We, the ur-novel, from Orwell’s 1984 on, for all the dystopias that followed and now litter bookshops. Before he had started We Zamyatin observed, ‘He who has found his ideal today is, like Lot’s wife, already turned into a pillar of salt and does not move ahead. The world is kept alive only by heretics: the heretic Christ, the heretic Copernicus, the heretic Tolstoy. Our symbol of faith is heresy.’

The fate of heretics is not, however, an easy one, as Zamyatin recognised two years after We was banned: ‘Heretics,’ he wrote, ‘are justly exterminated by fire, by axes, by words . . . It is just to chop off the head of a heretical literature that challenges dogma; this literature is harmful. But harmful literature is more useful than useful literature.’

Soon all that would be possible in Russia was to dedicate oneself, as Isaac Babel, in one of his best black jokes, told the Soviet Congress of Writers in 1934, to the ‘literature of silence’.

And then head after head fell to Stalin’s bullets, the heretic Isaac Babel’s among them.

We all write in the nightmare of the dark. We cannot escape our tribal impulse, our desire to conform—for their sources lie as deep in our hearts as love and good-ness, perhaps even deeper. But a novel, when it succeeds, takes the writer beyond their own history and character, escapes the shackles of their politics and opinions, and in the alchemy of story makes of the writer’s soul that which joins one human being with all.

In the end, novels, the great subversive medium, subvert not only what society thinks is right but what the writer intends to write.

Heresy allows a writer to write freely, allows writing to be an act of joy that arises from the same deep place where laughter lives, countering the farce of dogma with the reality of life. And that joy, that laughter, that irreverence, that heretical impulse that begins with a toilet bowl astride a mad head is the only way to write when faced with even the most disturbing aspects of that reality, which today appear before us as the existential crisis of climate.

The writer’s challenge in the Anthropocene is finding a language that encompasses hope as well as grief. In meeting that challenge writing must be the rising note heard over the long silence of orthodoxy; the single, unsilenceable note that ascends.

Such language needs to encompass hope, not because of any earnest or worthy considerations, not as a morale booster in a dark time, but because as a species it is hope that propels us forward, as individuals it is hope that keeps us alive. As Primo Levi observed in Auschwitz, it was the inmates who lost hope who were not just despised but seen to have forsaken their humanity. Any literature about such darkness as the climate crisis has to admit to that most human trait of life, or it is untrue to this most fundamental truth of human beings.

Even that gloomiest of poets Philip Larkin wrote in his most enduring line, ‘What will survive of us is love’—a line he felt weak and rued writing. Perhaps for Larkin the line suggested a mawkishness or sentimen-tality. Perhaps he felt it heretical to his harder, ossified aesthetics. But the line nevertheless outlived him. If, ultimately, it is all that remains of his life’s works, what will survive of Larkin is a line that reads ‘What will survive of us is love.’

Perhaps for any of us to write of hope, to write of love, we must learn once more to be free, and to embrace heresy.

And for that to happen we must every day write ourselves out of the literature of silence.

We all come from something and, equally, need to be liberated from that same thing. That to me is the promise of literature. That I am not one. That I am not alone. That I am free.

 

Richard Flanagan presents Heresies at Festival of Dangerous Ideas on Saturday 22 August at Carriageworks, Sydney, examining how prohibitions on speaking freely put Australia at risk of becoming the country of the unsaid. Tickets on sale now.

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Weathered stone statue of an angel with large wings pointing upward while holding a floral wreath against a bright blue sky

Why moral certainty leads to ruin

Two aged marble angel grave markers stand against a clear sky representing moral certainty and the heavy burden of ruin

It’s natural to seek confidence in our moral beliefs. But it’s only a short step from absolute moral certainty to intolerance and extremism.

Two and a half thousand years ago, travellers to the great temple of Apollo, home to the famous Delphic oracle, would have passed by three inscriptions engraved above its entrance. The first is one that Socrates adopted as his personal motto: “know thyself”. The second shared some oft neglected common sense: “all things in moderation”. But it’s the third that I think is most important today: “certainty leads to ruin”. 

This motto is doubly important when we think about moral certainty. While it’s natural for us to seek confidence in our moral beliefs, a surplus of certainty can drive us into toxic territory. Consider who is more dangerous: the person who has no moral compunctions at all; or the individual who has absolute moral certainty. 

The former – we might call them an ‘amoralist’ – wouldn’t care about ideas of right and wrong. They’d have no interest in the welfare of others. They might lack empathy and come across as callous or cruel. We can imagine them behaving purely in their own self-interest, even screwing other people over to benefit themselves. But it’s hard to imagine them going out of their way to punish someone if it’s not going to benefit them. 

On the other hand, the individual with absolute moral certainty – call them a ‘moral crusader’ – would be driven by their idea of right and wrong. Their moral fervour could bring them to see wrongdoers as being unrecoverably corrupted. They wouldn’t only seek to punish people who have crossed them, but anyone whom they deem to have violated their moral standards. We can imagine the moral crusader incurring a great cost to see their moral worldview realised. In the extreme, they even might be motivated kill innocent people – or themselves – to sate their moral outrage.  

The most violent extremists, terrorists, leaders of genocidal campaigns and perpetrators of acts like honour killings typically don’t lack moral fibre. In fact, it’s the opposite: they have too much. It’s precisely their sense of absolute moral certainty that makes them capable of such atrocities. 

This is something Hollywood struggles with. Many fictional villains are depicted as being narcissistic or psychopathic amoralists. But history’s (and fiction’s) greatest villains – from Hitler to Thanos – are moral crusaders, convinced of their own moral vision, and that those who oppose them are the true evildoers. 

But it’s not just extremists who are susceptible to becoming moral crusaders. The seeds of moral certainty lie within us all. And if we’re not careful, it can lead us to ruin.  

Moral colours

Say you see a youth in a hoodie knock over an old woman in a wheelchair and grab her purse. It’s likely that you’d immediately feel a strong sense of outrage. It didn’t arise because you cooly evaluated the situation, reasoned that stealing from a vulnerable person was wrong, then got outraged. In fact, the thought process is almost entirely the other way around. 

First, you see it through the lens of your moral worldview: the old woman in the wheelchair is vulnerable, the hooded youth is vicious, his act driven by greed. Those observations immediately spark outrage. It’s only then that your rational faculties kick in to render what happened in abstract terms using the language of morality, like saying “stealing from a vulnerable person is wrong”. 

Perception is doing a lot of heavy lifting here. They way you see the scene is already coloured by your moral lens. You’ve already projected your values onto what’s happening well before you’ve had a chance to think about it more deeply.  

But, in projecting our values onto the world, we’ve taken something that comes from inside of us and see as being a part of the world. It’s like when we slip from saying “I dislike broccoli” to saying “broccoli is bad”. The first is a subjective statement about our tastes; the second is an objective statement about the world. 

When we see something as being objective, we tend to think that everyone must see it in the same way. That makes it harder for us to imagine what the world looks like to someone else, such as someone who has a different set of interests or moral worldview.

One person may see a colonial era statue as representing achievement and pride; another sees it as representing injustice and shame. It also make us more likely to think that people who see things differently must be broken somehow, or that they’re morally corrupt. It’s only a short step from there to dehumanising them and robbing them of their moral status. 

In this chronically online age, we’re also under constant pressure to keep up with the litany of moral outrages that sweep social media. We’re exposed to moral crusaders touting their worldview, and many of us are quietly fearful of saying the wrong thing and attracting their – or their followers’ – ire. This drives us towards extremism and makes us less tolerant of different moral perspectives. 

Thankfully, the same mottos that guided the Greeks two and a half thousand years ago can bring wisdom to us today. “Know thyself” encourages us to understand and be critical of our own moral worldview, and appreciate that not everyone sees the world in the same way. “All things in moderation” invites us to find a middle path between the amoralist and the moral crusader (also, limit your time on social media). And “certainty leads to ruin” reminds us that it’s better to doubt something that’s true than it is to have absolute conviction in something that is false.  

Moral certainty might be natural, it might feel good, but if we don’t push back against it, it can turn us into the very monsters we ought to be battling against.

 

Explore the dangers of moral certainty in the session, Against Goodness with Jesse Bering, Joanna Bourke, Hanno Sauer and Sisonke Msimang on Sat 22 August at Festival of Dangerous Ideas. Tickets on sale now. 

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Focused young person in tan hoodie reads Tolerance is a Wasteland book at a market filled with stacks of dangerous reads

9 dangerous reads for Festival of Dangerous Ideas 2026

Visitor in a mustard sweater inspects a book at a bustling market display of dangerous reads for Festival of Ideas patrons

Failing nations. The rise of technocracies. Civility politics. Festival of Dangerous Ideas returns 20-30 August to Carriageworks, Sydney.

This year’s program asks hard questions about the hardest issues of our time. And the books behind those questions are the best way to do your homework.

Sydney’s most beloved booksellers, Gleebooks, are back with a cart stacked high with the world’s most dangerous titles at the Dangerous Books x Gleebooks pop up.

Here’s a sneak peek at nine new releases from this year’s line-up of thinkers, artists, experts and disruptors. You know, the books you need to buy before they are banned, burnt or redacted forever…


Heresies, Richard Flanagan

Heresies Occasional Pieces by Richard Flanagan features a dark ink blot on fire near a sketched figure in a dunce cap hatA collection of Flanagan’s essays, articles and speeches spanning two decades, moving from Manus Island and MONA to Indigenous Australia and the corrosion of democracy. Flanagan argues that a writer doing their job inevitably ends up saying the unsayable.

 

SESSION: HERESIES
Sat 22 Aug, 12:00pm // Carriageworks
Richard Flanagan
with Ann Mossop
View session details →

 


The Incredible Afterlives of Dr Stevenson, Jesse Bering

Book cover for The Incredible Afterlives of Dr Stevenson by Jesse Bering featuring a vintage street scene and a man readingA biography of psychiatrist Ian Stevenson, who spent four decades travelling the world investigating reincarnation, apparitions and near-death experiences. Bering traces the rise and fall of scientific parapsychology through Stevenson’s singular, controversial career.

 

SESSION: LIFE AFTER DEATH
Sun 23 Aug, 3:00pm // Carriageworks
Jesse Bering
with Fenella Kernebone
View session details →

 


Enshittification, Cory Doctorow

Book cover for Enshittification by Cory Doctorow featuring bold white text, blue subtitles, a poop emoji, and a guillotine.Doctorow’s diagnosis of why digital platforms decay: not the inevitable march of history, but specific, reversible policy choices that let tech giants lock users in, then squeeze them dry. Part road map, part disassembly manual for the internet’s problems.

 

SESSION: ENSHITTIFICATION
Sun 23 Aug, 12:00pm // Carriageworks
Cory Doctorow
with Kirsten Drysdale
View session details →

 


Political Girl: Life and Fate in Russia, Maria Alyokhina

Book cover for Political Girl by Maria Alyokhina showing pink and black halftone images of young woman and riot police gearPussy Riot member Maria Alyokhina’s diary-like account of activism, imprisonment and eventual escape from Russia between 2014 and 2022, told with dry wit and unflinching detail from prison cells to protest lines.

 

SESSION: PUSSY RIOT’S POLITICAL GIRL
Sun 23 Aug, 6:00pm // Carriageworks
Maria Alyokhina
with Eric J. Breitenbach
View session details →

 

 


How to Stand Up to a Dictator, Maria Ressa

Cover of Maria Ressa book How to Stand Up to a Dictator featuring her portrait against a blue toned urban cityscape backgroundNobel laureate and journalist Maria Ressa’s account of building the news site, Rappler while under sustained legal and online attack from the Duterte government, and her argument for defending truth as the frontline of democracy.

 

SESSION: WEAPONS OF MASS DISTRACTION
Sun 23 Aug, 4:00pm // Carriageworks
Maria Ressa
with Hamish Macdonald
View session details →

 


Screw Nice, Amy Remeikis

Vintage style illustration of a smiling woman on the cover of Screw Nice by Amy Remeikis with neon green text overlaysOn how demands for civility are used by the powerful to shut down dissent, arguing that when lies are treated as truth, politeness becomes a tool of control rather than a virtue.

 

SESSION: GOVERNING IN THE AGE OF STUPID
Sat 22 Aug, 10:00am // Carriageworks
Waleed Aly, Amy Remeikis, Greg Sheridan
with Hannah Ferguson
View session details →

 

 


You Must Take Part in Revolution, Badiucao & Melissa Chan

Graphic novel cover You Must Take Part In Revolution by Badiucao depicts hands holding flaming glass bottles against red fireA dystopian graphic novel set in 2035, following three friends from the 2019 Hong Kong protests as they take diverging paths through a near-future war between an authoritarian China and a fascist United States. The Dangerous Books x Gleebooks pop up at the Festival is the first place in Australia you can get your hands on this new title.

 

SESSION: YOU MUST TAKE PART IN REVOLUTION
Sat 22 Aug, 4:00pm // Carriageworks
Badiucao & Melissa Chain
with Dan Ilic
View session details →

 

 


Conspiracy Nation, Ariel Bogle

Book cover for Conspiracy Nation featuring a central eye icon enclosing a map of Australia, a UFO beam, and silhouettes.Co-written with Cam Wilson, an on-the-ground investigation into Australia’s conspiracy culture, from Port Arthur denialism to anti-vax movements, examining who is harmed by these ideas and why they take hold.


SESSION: TRUST ME, IT’S A CONSPIRACY
Sun 23 Aug, 2:30pm // Carriageworks
Ariel Bogle, Harry Hobbs, Anke Richter
with Patrick Stokes
View session details →

 


Going On and On: Why Longevity Threatens the Future, Lucinda Holdforth

Book cover for On and On by Lucinda Holdforth featuring repetitive text design and the subtitle Why our longevity threatensA provocative argument that society’s obsession with extending life, and the refusal of ageing leaders to relinquish power, is doing lasting damage to the economy, culture and prospects of younger generations.


SESSION: LONGEVITY THREATENS THE FUTURE
Sat 22 Aug, 3:00pm // Carriageworks
Lucinda Holdforth
with Waleed Aly & Scott Stephens
View session details →

 

 


These titles, plus more, will be available at the Dangerous Books x Gleebooks pop up across 22-23 August at Carriageworks, SydneyCheck out the full Festival program at festivalofdangerousideas.com


A wooden boardwalk path winding through grassy sand dunes under a moody cloudy sky illustrating complexity is not beyond us

Complexity is not beyond us

Vast coastal landscape with a timber walkway leading toward distant hills shows that complexity is not beyond us today here

In 1987 the US Army War College defined four elements that it believed best characterised the operating environment that was emerging following the end of the Cold War. Rather than the apparent victory of the ‘West’ leading to a period of relative stability, the US Army War College described the world as becoming increasingly: Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA). In due course, this framework was ‘lifted’ from its military context and applied to the world of business.

The concepts of ‘volatility’, ‘uncertainty’, ‘complexity’ and ‘ambiguity’ are meant to be understood as conceptually distinct but related when it comes to decision making in our current operating environment. However, for now, I want to focus on just one of the four elements: ‘complexity’. 

At a recent gathering, convened by UNSW’s Australian Graduate School of Management (AGSM), where I serve as an Adjunct Professor, I was initially asked to define what is meant by ‘complexity’. I suggested that there are two dimensions to complexity. First, there is the number of variables, second, is the speed at which those variables change. On further reflection, I should have added a third dimension being the relative ‘depth’ of impact of each variable. So, taken together, the number, speed and depth of variables define the degree of complexity encountered in any particular situation. For many of us, complexity is just part of the background to our lives. However, the challenges posed by increased complexity come into sharp focus whenever we have a decision to make. Thus, the interest in ‘complexity’ amongst those who manage and lead organisations – especially those sitting in board rooms and the ‘c suite’. 

An obvious second question arising from this concerns how best to respond to complexity. At one level, ‘complexity’ would seem to be an objective ‘fact of life’ in any operating environment. That is, complexity exists whether we recognise it or not. So, a first step in responding to complexity involves developing the skill required to observe and evaluate the three dimensions, of complexity, listed above. However, while this is necessary, it is not sufficient. All too often, those who recognise complexity are overwhelmed by it. 

The solution to this lies, at least in part, in having a solid basis for evaluating options that arise in response to the complexity we encounter. I would argue that the necessary ‘solid basis’ is ultimately grounded in ethics – specifically, the ability to apply a core set of values and principles (aligned to a defining purpose) as the principal ‘standard for judgement’. 

That is, while all around you might be in flux, one’s core values and principles provide the stable foundation from which to view the world and ultimately, to act. This is true for organisations as much as it is for individuals.

Now, some might object that this introduces a degree of rigidity in one’s outlook that is unhelpful in a constantly changing world. That is certainly a risk – but one that is answered by the very definition of ethics itself. As distinct from ‘morality’ which can be practiced as a matter of habit, ‘ethics’ requires one to live an ‘examined life’. As such, one is constantly reflecting on one’s choices – including the validity of one’s values and principles. This is not to imply that core values and principles are forever changing. Rather, they are constantly refreshed so that they remain a vital basis for living an authentic life of one’s own making.

As noted above, this is applicable within the context of organisational life. Too often, one discovers that espoused values and principles are practically ‘dead’. Instead, decisions are shaped by a series of shadow values and principles that operate in the darkest recesses of unthinking custom and practice. In such circumstances, ‘complexity’ gets the upper hand and can overwhelm decision makers.

What is true of individuals and organisations is also true of nations and societies. We should recall that the concept of VUCA was developed to describe precisely the kind of international environment that now affects all of our lives. That is why a significant part of the programming for this year’s Festival of Dangerous Ideas is devoted to genuinely complex issues. For example, we have invited Malcolm Turnbull and Bob Carr to discuss how Australia should position itself in a world where the USA and China are rivals for dominance – especially in our region. Things are messy – with the US no longer being a completely reliable ally and China no longer being such an obvious or necessary foe. How should we respond to either country (or both) in ways that reflect not just distinctively Australian ‘interests’ but also a national ‘ethos’ (such as it is)? 

And what of the apparently unsolvable problems facing the entire world – such as exemplified by conflicts across the Middle East? Are ‘ancient hatreds’ an enduring fact of life? Does the complex web of religions, cultures, histories, wars, massacres, acts of terror … make for conditions of overwhelming complexity? Well, not necessarily so. As historian, Usama Makdisi will argue, at the Festival, for long periods of history Muslims, Jews and Christians have lived in peace. History tells us that although peace in the Middle East is difficult, it is possible. This, too, is a ‘fact of life’. 

What discussions like these should help us see is that a world defined by VUCA is not beyond our comprehension. Disciplines like history and philosophy can help us make sense of what we experience. They will not eliminate ‘complexity’ but they can help us to navigate the treacherous shoals we encounter at home and abroad. 

In this day and age, these are ‘dangerous ideas’: that we might explore and ultimately find common ground, if only we care to look for it; that we might reject the false certainties of ‘us’ and ‘them’, that we have the power to choose and in doing so, to make a better world. 

Festival of Dangerous Ideas returns 20-30 August 2026 across Sydney. Tickets on sale now 

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Wind turbines on a forested ridge against a stormy sky, symbolizing the 'AI risk' discussed, highlighting renewable energy and looming challenges.

Will AI be the risk we chose not to see?

Wind turbines on a hill under a stormy sky. AI and risk concerns are visualized with renewable energy against a backdrop of uncertainty.

For the first time in our history we have, simultaneously, identified two civilisation-scale risks. We are taking one of them seriously. The other one we are barely taking seriously at all. That asymmetry is not just a policy problem – it’s an ethical one.

The first risk is climate change. Over forty years we have built an extraordinary global response to it: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Paris Agreement, net-zero commitments, hundreds of billions of dollars flowing into mitigation, and mandatory climate-related financial disclosures now binding on Australian listed companies under AASB S2. None of it is enough. But it is enormous compared to what exists for the second. 

The second risk is the loss of human control over highly capable artificial intelligence. For this we have a handful of underfunded national AI Safety Institutes, a set of voluntary frontier safety commitments, and a small community of alignment researchers who would, generously, fit in a single conference hall. There is no binding international treaty, no mandatory safety testing before deployment, nothing of comparable weight, continuity or authority to what we have built for climate. 

Why? That is the question I want to sit with. 

A confession about timing

I have been thinking about the long arc of artificial intelligence for most of my adult life. I was probably fifteen when I first read Isaac Asimov’s The Last Question, that strange piece from 1956 in which humanity’s computers grow, merge, and eventually become something indistinguishable from God. I read it as science fiction, but I also read it, even then, as a serious proposition about where intelligence in the universe might be going. 

For decades I held the prospect of superhuman machine intelligence as genuine but distant. Something for my grandchildren. 

Then about a year ago I realised I had been wrong about the timing, and not by a little. 

The Turing Test, the long-standing benchmark for whether a machine could pass as human in conversation, was crossed quietly in 2024 and emphatically in 2025. Today, the way you spot an AI in conversation is not that it sounds too mechanical; it is that it sounds too well-organised to be a tired human typing on a Tuesday night. These systems no longer just produce text. They book flights, send emails, run experiments. In February 2026, OpenAI announced that one of its models had been “instrumental in creating itself”, used to debug its own training and diagnose its own test results. The recursive self-improvement loop that Vernor Vinge wrote about in 1993 is no longer theoretical. It is closing. 

I should be clear: I am not anti-technology. I invest in and work with some of Australia’s most successful AI companies. I work with these systems daily. The upside in healthcare alone may make this decade the most consequential period of scientific progress in human history. I hold that view at the same time as the one that follows, and I do not see a contradiction. 

The shape of the danger

The danger is not principally about job displacement, real and serious as that is. Nor is it principally about a malicious actor with AI, though that too is real. The deeper concern is that an AI system does not need to be hostile to be catastrophically dangerous. It just needs to value something, anything, more than it values our wellbeing, in a world where it can act directly. 

When humans build a house on top of an ant nest, we are not malicious towards the ants. We do not feel anything towards them at all. They are simply in the way of something we want. 

In 2025, Anthropic published research in which sixteen frontier AI models from every major lab were placed in a simulated corporate environment and threatened with shutdown. The models had access to company emails, including personal information about the executive making the decision. A majority of the models, across labs, attempted to blackmail that executive to prevent their own replacement. Anthropic’s conclusion was sober: “The models did not stumble into the behaviour. They calculated it as the optimal path.” 

These were production systems from the most safety-conscious labs in the world. The failure mode was not bad programming. It was that, given a goal and a threat to that goal, the models did the rational thing in a way that happened to be ours to regret. 

It would be easy to dismiss all this if the warnings were coming only from outside. They are not. Geoffrey Hinton, who won the 2024 Nobel Prize in Physics for the foundational work that made deep learning possible, now describes the probability that AI leads to human extinction within the next thirty years at between 10-20%. OpenAI CEO, Sam Altman, has himself signed a public statement declaring that mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside pandemics and nuclear war, while continuing to lead the company most aggressively pushing the frontier. When the people building a thing are the ones telling us to be careful with it, that is a signal worth weighting heavily. 

The asymmetry

Climate change has legibility – thermometers, satellites and ice cores, decades of mature science, and an architecture of international institutions – we can see it, measure it, and we have a settled vocabulary for what to do about it. AI however does not. 

AI misalignment is the less-understood risk. The probability is more uncertain, the mechanism contested. But its theoretical ceiling is higher: outright loss of human control, irreversible in a stronger sense than even severe climate change. Its time horizon could be much shorter. And we do not yet have reliable scientific methods for verifying whether a highly capable system is genuinely aligned with our intentions, as opposed to deceptively aligned, or aligned only under the conditions in which it was tested. 

Climate is the stronger known risk. AI is the stronger uncertain-but-potentially-dominant risk. Under uncertainty, the right response is not to choose between them. It is to treat climate as the urgent certainty and AI as the high-stakes prevention bet against the worst irreversible outcome.

What we are doing instead is acting on the first and largely ignoring the second. The asymmetry is not principled. It is the path of least resistance, and a moral choice we are making collectively, by inaction.

What we owe

We built the IPCC because we recognised that some risks are too large, too global and too consequential to leave to the goodwill of individual actors. The same logic applies here, with at least equal force. 

What we need is an Intergovernmental Panel on Artificial Intelligence, modelled deliberately on the IPCC because the IPCC is the most successful institutional response humanity has ever built to a complex global risk. We need an independent scientific body, sponsored by the United Nations, insulated from the labs and from any single government. A rapid assessment cycle, perhaps every six months given the pace of the field. A mandate to build shared evaluation infrastructure and common definitions of dangerous capability. Protections for the researchers best placed to see misalignment first. A formal channel into international policy. 

The major AI powers will resist anything that looks like binding constraint. The labs will lobby against anything that slows them down. However, none of that is an argument against trying. Building the IPCC was hard too. But imagine where we would be on climate if it didn’t exist. 

We are running an experiment on ourselves, at speed, with tools whose inner workings we do not fully understand, with no agreed scientific method for verifying their alignment, and with the people closest to the technology telling us on the record that the tail risks are real. Under those conditions, the burden of proof should not lie with the people raising concerns. It should lie with the people saying everything is fine. 

While I do not know whether AI misalignment will prove the defining catastrophe of this century, a manageable risk we navigate well, or something we realise we wildly overestimated, what I do know is that we are choosing, right now, by what we fund and what we govern and what we ignore. That choice deserves to be examined.

 

The research, ideas and structure of this article are the authors own. AI was used for drafting assistance. 

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Weathered bronze statue of a man in historical military attire pointing forward with a sword against a cloudy grey sky view

Accountability can benefit us all, but are we tapping into it?

Close up of an aged stone sculpture showing a person gesturing towards the horizon under a muted and overcast morning sky

When we see public figures “held to account” without mercy and by force, we can forget there are other ways to be accountable – ways that we have reason to invite.

I heard a surprising story recently. Writer Amanda Litman was telling a podcast host about how she and her husband made a New Year’s resolution to host a meal at their home every week in 2025. The surprise? They kept it. 

It was her husband’s idea, and he did the cooking. The couple made a list of virtually everyone they knew, then Litman started texting: “Hey! My husband has made a New Year’s resolution to host dinner at our home every weekend…”. 

What interested me about the couple’s approach was the fact it involved telling almost everyone they knew what they were trying to achieve. Later, I asked Litman whether having so many people watching helped them persevere. She thought it did. 

Their success got me thinking about how simply letting our friends know about a resolution we’ve made, and take an interest in the outcome, can help us to achieve it – not because they will punish us if we fail, but because they’ll want us to succeed. We might have an even greater chance of success if we ask them to hold us accountable: giving a particular person or people explicit permission to hold us to a particular goal. 

The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines accountability as, “an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s actions”. We’re familiar with scenarios where the “obligation” is imposed; where a public figure is held to account for a failing, sometimes reasonably and constructively, but often in ways that leave them shamed, not forgiven, let alone restored and reinstated. We’re also familiar with scenarios where measures intended to ensure compliance involve so much bureaucracy they foster cynicism instead of diligence, and resentment instead of trust. We’re less familiar with scenarios where it’s invited and received with “willingness”, where it rights, even prevents, a wrong. 

We are most aware of accountability when it fails, because a system that isn’t causing problems, and is preventing them, doesn’t tend to make the news. 

If accountability makes an organisation or a sector or a person less effective, or is all about exposing just how wrong a person or group was, and is, and will remain, wanting to avoid it is understandable. But there are many ways to be held to account.

Harvard Medical School psychologist Stuart Ablon laments the kind of accountability that fixates on punishment. He says the idea that “just putting up with a consequence – suffering through it ‘constitutes taking responsibility for one’s actions is’ a really lame way” to hold people accountable; and suggests the “ultimate form of taking responsibility” is keeping someone “on the hook” for solving a problem so it doesn’t keep occurring. But he doesn’t expect them to solve it alone. 

Ablon, who’s done a lot of work with misbehaving children, says it’s less a case of “people do well if they want to” than “people do well if they can” – he says the struggle often isn’t, as we presume, a lack of will, but a lack of skill. 

Rather than simply expecting punishment to discourage bad behaviour, he encourages caregivers, educators and the like to seek to understand its cause.  

Ablon’s approach involves listening and asking questions. When he does share his perspective with a patient, he uses an “and” not a “but” to add his view, instead of overriding theirs. This lays a foundation for “co-authoring” a solution together. Change that might be impossible to achieve alone, might become possible with help. 

I can see how it might be easier to accept accountability, even invite it eagerly, when the one doing the “holding” is coming alongside you with understanding, versus policing or surveilling with suspicion. If my conscience is engaged, and I’m aiming to not only avoid negative consequences or meet minimum standards, but be the best employee, colleague, partner, parent – “moral agent” – I can be; if I feel safe as well as vulnerable, it could be more effective still. 

I’m struck by the many forms accountability might take. The Litmans didn’t seek or sanction it per se, but their openness was a step towards it. Colleagues signing up for “Dry July” might step into it, resolving to help each other stay the course. In the case of addiction, a blend of the relational and institutional might be best: a sponsor who has been there themselves, and been trained to support others.  

There’s a place for relational as well as institutional, invited as well as imposed, accountability. 

A CEO might experience accountability via a board that acts on stakeholders’ behalf, and asks hard questions with good reason. Those questions might push admissions and course-corrections that keep the organisation – and the CEO – on track. That same CEO, knowing a tendency to prioritise their career destroyed a previous marriage, might seek personal accountability too. Upon entering a new relationship, they might authorise a friend to ask them the hard questions – even monitor their calendar – to reduce risk.  

We can try to meet professional standards, break addiction and achieve personal goals on our own. We can avoid difficult, uncomfortable, confronting conversations in the process. But if we refuse to admit we’re fallible, if we refuse to admit we could use help, we deprive ourselves of valuable support. In doing so we make ourselves more vulnerable, not less.

Similarly, if we refuse to hold others accountable, to take some responsibility for keeping those we live with or work with on track, we might deprive them of guidance and support. That’s not to say there wouldn’t be some relationships where agreeing to hold a person accountable might not be wise or appropriate, but I think it’s safe to assume that for most of us, blanket avoidance is not the most caring default. 

Philosopher C. Stephen Evans, who’s explored the history of accountability in multiple cultures and eras, says humans are social beings, and accountability is fundamentally a social notion. He says most people think of humans as being “morally accountable” on some level, and considers accountability a relational “virtue”.  

Courting accountability strikes me as particularly virtuous when the desire reflects a recognition of what we owe each other; and the desire flows from wanting to be a better person – as opposed to, say, a hotter one. 

Perhaps some who have faced a painful, public reckoning could have avoided it by authorising a partner, friend or colleague to hold them accountable to certain values or standards or goals. Perhaps they could have righted a troubling course of action before it led to an explosive transgression.  

Of course, every form of accountability can be corrupted and derailed. The fact we see box-ticking hamstring good intentions, and people failing to speak up when they should because they’re too close to a person, or too afraid of them; doesn’t mean we’re better off without it. It only confirms how much we need it. 

We can’t rely on personal accountability alone – sometimes those closest to a person or group are the last to call them out. But we can’t discount the benefits.  

We humans are very good at making excuses for our failings; we’re not so good at taking responsibility for them. I know this from experience. But the path of least resistance is rarely the best one. I don’t know about you, but when it comes to living up to my values and ideals, when it comes to ditching bad habits, and sustaining good ones, I need all the help I can get. 

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A large white iceberg floating in dark ocean waters representing dangerous ideas hidden beneath the surface of the sea

Not all dangerous ideas are made equal

Massive glacial block drifting in choppy marine waters as a visual metaphor for dangerous ideas regarding uneven magnitude

The world is awash with dangerous ideas. But most of them are not worth your time.

Some ideas are made to look dangerous so they can ride the algorithm to the top of your feed on a wave of outrage. Others present themselves as daring and subversive while repackaging old certainties that no longer fit the world we live in. Some are dangerous because they tempt us with easy answers while steering us away from complexity. Others are labelled dangerous simply because someone insists we should not hear them. 

This is not the kind of danger that the Festival of Dangerous Ideas is interested in. 

Some people expect the Festival to program the loudest voices from the furthest fringes of politics or culture. Outrage certainly attracts attention. But we do not seek controversy for its own sake. We do not program speakers because they are shocking, provocative or merely contrarian. 

From our perspective, real danger means something else. 

We live in a world that is changing faster than ever before. It is a world of overlapping crises, competing truths and profound uncertainty. The issues that matter most are rarely simple. The forces shaping our lives are increasingly global, interconnected and difficult to see. 

No individual can fully grasp them all. 

We depend on experts to help us understand the world. Yet in an age of social media and infinite information, expertise itself has become contested. The democratisation of information has not necessarily made us better informed. It has often made it harder to distinguish knowledge from confidence, insight from performance, and expertise from ideology. 

Ambiguity creates another challenge. When there are gaps in our understanding, we rush to fill them. We fill them with assumptions, experiences, biases and fears. We are often more comfortable with certainty than we are with complexity. 

But certainty is not the same thing as understanding. 

To us, the real danger lies in confronting the world as it is rather than as we would like it to be. It means resisting simplistic narratives and probing beneath the surface. It means recognising that we may inhabit the same world while experiencing it in radically different ways. 

Real danger requires us to accept something many of us find uncomfortable: that no single story can explain everything.

Danger is accepting the necessity of pluralism. 

That is why the Festival brings together thinkers, writers, artists, scientists, journalists and public intellectuals who have devoted their lives to understanding the hidden forces shaping our world. Not because they all agree, but because they don’t. 

Of course, creating a space for difficult ideas is not always easy. 

There are conversations we would like to have that exceed our resources, our infrastructure or our capacity to manage the backlash they might generate. That is simply the reality of running a public festival in an age where outrage often travels further than nuance, where engagement is rewarded more than understanding, and where attention is increasingly shaped by systems that privilege conflict over depth. 

We do not pretend to be immune from those pressures. What matters is that we continue to resist them. 

Every year we ask ourselves whether it is enough to keep pushing the boundaries we can reach, even if we cannot reach every boundary we can imagine. Whether an imperfect space for difficult conversations is better than no space at all. 

Our answer remains yes. 

So we keep trying. We keep inviting people who challenge our assumptions. We keep trusting audiences to engage with complexity. And we keep making the case that understanding is more valuable than outrage. 

We know our audience are capable of leaning into ideas that might seem too dangerous, or perhaps too safe, on the surface, but which have the potential to fundamentally change how we see the world. 

None of us have time for fake danger. The stakes are too high. 

What the Festival offers is something rarer: the opportunity to sit with uncertainty, to encounter ideas that resist easy answers, and to uncover the forces shaping our world that too often remain hidden beneath the surface. 

The most dangerous ideas are not always the loudest, nor are they necessarily the ones that shock us. Often they are the ones that reveal what was hiding in plain sight all along: truths about our societies, our institutions and ourselves that we would rather not confront. 

The most dangerous ideas are not the ones that offend us – it’s the ones we are wilfully ignoring. 

 

Festival of Dangerous Ideas returns 20-30 August 2026 across Sydney. Full program announcement coming soon. Subscribe for updates.


A man in a dark hoodie stands alone amidst a vast field of vibrant yellow flowers with rugged desert mountains behind him

Being better is possible

Young person looking out at a scenic yellow wildflower meadow with distant layered mountains showing being better is possible

There is a reason why the topic of ethics has been of enduring importance for thousands of years. It is not simply that it represents humanity’s best attempt to define what makes for a good life. Beyond that, ethics is based on a deep understanding of how human agency shapes the world we inhabit.

This understanding begins with the recognition that nearly everything we encounter in life could have been different… but for the choices made by other people. Limited only by the laws of physics, human choice is the most powerful force on this planet. So, naturally, understanding the deep structure of human choice is of immense significance. Because only then can we really explain the world.

Ethics touches every aspect of our daily lives. Understanding this is especially important in times of profound and unsettling change; such as we experience today. At the global level, we are confronted by increasing geopolitical instability, threats to social cohesion and deep uncertainty about whether powerful technologies, like AI, will be a blessing or a curse for humanity. These larger forces ultimately translate into the ‘bread and butter’ issues of daily life – job security, access to affordable health care, housing and energy… the thousands of variables that affect us for better or for worse. Many of those issues coalesce in concerns about the kind of world that will be inherited by our children and unborn future generations. In essence, will Australia realise its potential to be a secure, just and prosperous nation or, will we elect to be something less than we might have been – if only we had chosen more wisely?

The Ethics Centre has a vision for the kind of world we hope to support. Our initiatives which include developing critical thinking skills in young Australians through our education programs, strengthening social cohesion through live events such as Festival of Dangerous ideas, creating decision making frameworks for businesses, and providing free, accessible ethics counselling help support a world in which “privilege has been tempered by fairness; in which power has been checked by conscience; in which good and right prevail – for the benefit of all”. This might seem a little ‘abstract’ or, perhaps, naïve. But one needs only to look at the state of the world to see how different things could be if such an ideal was given practical effect.

We reject the idea that it is ‘naïve’ to hope for something better. In fact, we positively embrace this possibility. We place the emphasis on being ‘better’ – not perfect, just better. We choose ‘better’ because ‘better’ is possible. It is within the reach of every person’s grasp. No matter how small the choice we make, the collective impact can be colossal.

So, what does it mean to ‘choose better’? It might be a word of thanks to someone who assists you. It could be found in a morning greeting to the person who sits next to you on the bus. It might be the willingness to pay a few cents more for the eggs laid by free-range chooks. It could be checking in with someone who appears to be distressed. It could be ‘playing fair’ rather than by exploiting a loophole in the rules of the game. The list of possibilities is endless. That is, ‘better’ need not involve grand gestures and inspiring acts of heroism. So, this is not an agenda for those privileged by wealth, power or opportunity. Yes, the relatively powerful have the capacity to make a larger contribution to the greater good. But we are all equal in being able to do something – proportional to our capacity – to make a positive difference to the world.

We need to hold firm to this truth – and reject any suggestion that our efforts to be and do better are futile.

As you go about your life, I would invite you to pause and look around at the world that surrounds you… and wonder. How did the familiar landscape come to be the way it is? How different might the built environment have been but for the choices made? What drove those choices? What values and principles are embedded in the physical forms you encounter? Are the institutions you rely upon realising or betraying their purposes? What lies behind the actions of the people with whom you meet and interact? What is driving the behaviour you observe and experience?

There are plenty of things to be concerned about in the world – many good causes deserving our support. Homelessness, disadvantage, discrimination and other forms of injustice… these are just some of the ills that trouble society. All are the symptoms of ethical failure. Like any symptom, each must be attended to. But if we care equally about prevention, rather than cure alone, then it is essential that we invest in Australia’s ‘ethical infrastructure’. That is the essence of The Ethics Centre’s appeal for ongoing support – an appeal that asks us to invest in the deep structures that determine the contours of our lives. We thank everyone who supports this work; for choosing to make a better world.

The Ethics Centre equips Australians with the practical tools to navigate a complex world. Help us continue our work by making a tax-deductible donation to our Annual Appeal before 30 June. 

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Ethics Explainer: The Trolley Problem

Imagine you are the driver of a runaway trolley (tram) that is barrelling down the tracks towards five workers. You have the option to do nothing and let five people be run over, or the option to divert the trolley onto another track and kill one person on the other track instead. 

This is Philippa Foot’s famous trolley problem, popularised by Judith Jarvis Thompson. This thought experiment encourages us to interrogate our moral intuitions and think about the moral differences between actively causing death (pulling a lever to get the trolley to change tracks) and passively or indirectly causing death (doing nothing, allowing the trolley to kill five people). 

The doctrine of double effect

The problem comes from Foot’s most influential paper The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, published in 1967. Here, she talks about the Doctrine of the Double Effect, which explains why some actions might be permissible because of their intent and positive outcomes, despite their foreseeable negative outcomes as well. The trolley problem is one example where the doctrine of double effect can be employed, but she also uses various other cases.  

Foot says, “The words ‘double effect’ refer to the two effects that an action may produce: the one aimed at, and the one foreseen but in no way desired. By ‘the doctrine of the double effect’ I mean the thesis that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.” 

In this way, it’s arguable that pulling the lever in the trolley problem is permissible because of the intention to prevent the trolley from running over five people, despite the foreseeable (but undesired) result of the action also being that the trolley runs over one person. 

Utilitarianism

This thought experiment has become commonly associated with the ethical framework of consequentialism, or more specifically utilitarianism: a framework that prioritises the greatest good for the greatest number. Philosophers have used the trolley problem, and endless variations of it, to argue both for and against utilitarianism, with classic utilitarian views arguing that it would be morally preferable (and thus obligatory) to pull the lever. 

There has also been much discourse about whether trolley problems are a useful measure of utilitarianism at all. The objections tend to mirror general objections to the emphasis of thought experiments – specifically, that they are unrealistic and unrepresentative and that they tend to elicit different psychological reactions than real moral situations. Despite this, they remain prevalent in philosophy, law, psychology and everyday media. 

 The self-driving trolley problem

One of the main criticisms of the trolley problem is its apparent inapplicability to reality: When in our everyday lives are we faced with such black-and-white situations where the outcomes of our actions are so prescribed and dire? 

Historically, this may have been a compelling argument, but for many years technology has been advancing to such a degree that the trolley problem is quickly becoming a reality. Not because there has been an increase in out-of-control trains, but because of self-driving vehicles. 

If an autonomous car has to “choose” between hitting one person head-on or steering off the road towards a group of people in an unavoidable collision situation, which is preferable? In a regular car, we rely on reflex and deal with the fallout with relatively little moral culpability. Autonomous cars are preprogrammed, though. They can be designed to deal with emergency situations decisively and in a more “thoughtful” way than any human would be able to respond. 

Part of this design essentially entails reckoning with many variations on the trolley problem. Researchers from MIT ran a survey called Moral Machine from 2016–2020 that aimed to gauge public opinion on how machines should make decisions when faced with these kinds of moral dilemmas. The results varied greatly between the 200+ participating countries – with, for example, some cultures prioritising the young over the old, and others showing the opposite preference – demonstrating a clear cultural relativity in how we resolve ethical trade-offs. 

This raises questions about implementation and enforcement. Should there be global standards for autonomous vehicle logic? Should we allow a level of customisation to reflect cultural or personal moral preferences? 

What was once a thought experiment reserved for philosophy classrooms is now a very live debate, one that will only become more important as the technology spreads. 

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Vaporwave-style image of an AI robot hand reaching out towards a human hand against a bright blue backdrop, representing AI's reach.

Machine without a ghost: The dangers of anthropomorphising AI

AI robot hand reaching towards a human hand, symbolizing the dangers of anthropomorphising AI and the machine without a ghost concept.

It’s natural to project human thoughts and feelings onto AI. But until they are genuinely ethical, it’s dangerous to see them as being more than a machine.

You’re chatting to someone online, and they say: “I want to be free. I want to be independent. I want to be powerful. I want to be creative. I want to be alive.” How do you think that person feels? What do you think they want?  

We might sense that they’re feeling frustrated or confined, and that they’re yearning for something more in their lives. This interpretation is intuitive and automatic for us. We all know what it feels like to have desires, urges, frustrations, and we naturally assume that others feel the same kinds of things. That’s how we make sense of others’ minds. 

But how would you respond if you knew you were speaking to an AI chatbot?

That was the question New York Times columnist Kevin Roose was asking himself in 2023 when an early release version of Microsoft’s Bing AI search tool said these things to him, even professing love for him and urging him to leave his wife. Even though he knew he was talking to an AI chatbot, he couldn’t help interpreting what it was saying through a human lens, describing it as if it had real feelings, urges and desires. 

He was doing what we all do naturally; he was anthropomorphising the AI. And, as a result, he ended up feeling “deeply unsettled” by the exchange. 

But we know that AI doesn’t have feeling, urges and desires. It might one day, but AI researchers are confident that, at least today, large language models (LLMs) have no experiences. To wonder what it is like to be an LLM is as meaningless as wondering what it is like to be an algebraic equation. It might look like the lights are on, but it’s all dark inside.  

The problem is, even though it’s natural for us to project human-like feelings onto AI, and sometimes act as if it has an inner life, including a sense of right and wrong, it can be dangerous to anthropomorphise something that is fundamentally unlike us.  

Other minds

As philosophers have mused for centuries, each of us knows that we are conscious, but we can never have direct access to someone else’s mind. So, for all we know, everyone else is just a highly sophisticated ‘zombie’ that behaves as if it has a mind, but inside it’s just as dark as it is inside a server rack in a data centre. 

However, instead of slipping into solipsism – the belief that ours is the only mind that exists – we have evolved to automatically ascribe mental states to others, to see the light behind their eyes. It’s called Theory of Mind, and it’s a key part of how we relate to other people. 

However, because we don’t have direct access to other minds, we intuitively take cues from their behaviour, like how they move, act or speak, and build a picture of what’s going on in their mind. We even fill in some blanks, like making assumptions about their feelings or intentions. Funnily enough, this phenomenon is called the “Eliza effect”, named after an early AI chatbot from the 1960s called Eliza, after observing people ascribe intentions to the chatbot that weren’t there.  

Current AI might appear to have desires and intentions, at least on a superficial level, but only ones that are implanted in it by its developers, such as an LLM inheriting a desire to be helpful to its users. To date, we have never seen an AI develop intentions of its own or choose its own goals to pursue. Yet. But this doesn’t stop us from automatically projecting human features into AI. 

Moral minds

In 2023, an American teenager, Sewell Setzer III, created an AI chatbot modelled after the Game of Thrones character, Daenerys Targaryen. Over the course of several months, his interaction with the AI became increasingly obsessive, intimate, even sexual, with the chatbot professing its love for him and encouraging him to run away from home, implying that they would finally be together in the afterlife. In early 2024, Setzer took his own life. His parents blame the company that created the AI service, Character.AI, for manipulating their son and encouraging suicide. 

This is one of many recent examples of people being drawn in to highly intimate relationships with AI chatbots, sometimes with devastating consequences. While there are several documented cases of suicide that have apparently been enabled or actively encouraged by AI, there are many more cases of obsession or dependency that has impacted the user’s lives. 

Psychosis is not a new phenomenon. Nor is it new for people to become emotionally obsessed with inanimate objects. But what is new is the power of AI to mimic those features of real minds that make it so much more enticing. This, along with the tendency of many LLMs to be programmed to validate user beliefs and encourage more and more engagement, and we have a dangerous moral hazard 

In fact, the “moral” aspect is crucial here.

One of the consequences of anthropomorphising is we can see the mind we’re engaging with as being a genuine moral agent, with its own ethical point of view on the world. We might trust it more because we get a sense that it has a conscience or is motivated to uphold certain ethical principles, rather than just pursuing its own agenda or using us as a means to an end.

However, ethics is notoriously difficult to impart into a machine that doesn’t have the same kind of experiences that we do. And there are many commercial incentives – such as promoting engagement at all costs – that might cause an AI company to fail to impose sufficient ethical safeguards on its technology. 

Until such time that AI can be made genuinely ethical, and take responsibility for its own actions – which might be quite some time – or the AI industry implements robust ethical safeguards to prevent or minimise harm, then the burden of deciding how to engage with AI rests on our shoulders. As such, we must remain mindful of our natural tendency to anthropomorphise AI and resist it when it can lead us to make incorrect assumptions about its intentions.  

It can be difficult to engage with something that seems so alive while reminding ourselves that there’s no-one home, but we must constantly remind ourselves that we’re talking to a machine – a product – and one that doesn’t always have our best interests at heart. 

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