We are all responsible for the horse in the skip bin

We are all responsible for the horse in the skip bin
Opinion + AnalysisSociety + Culture
BY Daniel Finlay 20 NOV 2026
On Monday 16 November, a racehorse was found dumped in a landfill skip bin. The horse was a five-year-old named So You Are who finished eighth in the Melbourne Cup just a few weeks prior and was euthanised by a vet two days before being found after unresolvable medical complications.
To me, this news is as horrifying as it is unsurprising. But most frustrating of all is some of the media coverage of the situation.
When certain public kinds of animal abuse happen, people like to treat them as anomalies. We are shocked, appalled, outraged, that such a corruption of our humanity could occur. We hear from people inside and outside industry lamenting the unfair and undignified treatment of these poor souls and calling for the head of the guilty.
In this case, the horse’s trainer was quick to voice his love and grief at the disrespect of the burial. “He was a much-loved horse, and he deserved to be treated with dignity and respect after his death.” Much of the public shares this disappointment about the treatment of the body after death.
The problem with this is that it is not an anomaly; it is an inevitable outcome of an unethical system of exploitation masquerading as sport, entertainment and profit.
From my perspective, the way that So You Are’s body was treated matters mostly as a reflection of industry and societal attitudes towards animals, and less so as the one-off barbarity that it’s portrayed as in headlines. We should be much less concerned about the optics of a horse in landfill and much more concerned about how we arrived at an environment that allowed it to happen – an environment where an understandably upset trainer can at the same time be oblivious to his role in a system of animal abuse.
A horse does not care how his body is treated after his death, but he did care how he lived and died.
Some articles have attempted to bring nuance to the table, but most seem much more concerned about the effects of the body in the bin rather than the bigger picture. Cathrynne Henshall writes for the ABC: “The distress belongs to the people who cared for him, and the real risk is to the animals that might eat from the carcass.” She then concludes: “If this case makes us care more about horses, that attention belongs with the living: how they are housed, trained, raced and retired, and whether their deaths are timely and humane.”
These aren’t questions with unknown answers that are just up for the reader’s interpretation. There are plenty of watchdogs and whistleblowers within the racing industry that collect information about the mistreatment of horses. But let’s focus on the main issue. Horse racing in Australia between 2024-2025 involved 35,625 horses and in that time 175 of them were killed – an average of one horse every two days. That’s a death rate of 1 in 200. For comparison, boxing is one of the deadliest sports for humans averaging 13 deaths per year or a death rate of 1 in 7,600. Do we truly think that horses deserve, through no choice of their own, to be subjected to almost 40 times more danger than we’re willing to subject ourselves to?
These horses are not dying of old age. Most racehorses are just four or five years old when they are killed and they are dying of exhaustion, heart attacks, and most commonly limb injuries. Limb injuries that are often not life-threatening, but profit-threatening. Racehorses who can no longer race are worthless in an industry that values a life by how much money it can make you.
It’s easy to be momentarily appalled by the very public disregard of life that we see in this news story. It is much harder to challenge our acceptance of the industry and culture that causes it.
If we think that So You Are deserved a better death, we should also think he, and all horses like him, deserved a better life. A life free of racing.

BY Daniel Finlay
Daniel is a philosopher, writer and editor. He works at The Ethics Centre as Youth Engagement Coordinator, supporting and developing the futures of young Australians through exposure to ethics.
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What whispers about the ‘Sandpapergate’ alleged cover-up might reveal about cricket’s culture

What whispers about the ‘Sandpapergate’ alleged cover-up might reveal about cricket’s culture
Opinion + AnalysisBusiness + LeadershipSociety + Culture
BY Simon Longstaff 13 NOV 2026
It is an iron law of history that the ‘cover-up’ of wrongdoing has consequences that are at least as dire as the original offence.
This is a lesson soon to be reinforced by what is likely to unfold in the wake of claims by retired test cricketer, Usman Khawaja, that the ball tampering incident in Cape Town (‘sandpapergate’) in 2018, was not an isolated incident perpetrated by just three players: Steve Smith, David Warner and Cameron Bancroft.
Instead, it is Khawaja’s evidence, now corroborated by David Warner, that sandpaper had been employed in an earlier test played in Port Elizabeth/Gqeberha. Furthermore, he claims that this was known by the whole of the Australian team.
As things stand, we are confronted by two groups of cricketers offering radically different accounts of what occurred. Neither side comes to the table with ‘clean hands’. In the case of Khawaja, we need to reckon with the fact that, on his own admission, he has been complicit in allowing a lie, about what occurred, to remain unchallenged. He has chosen to tell what he claims to be the truth of the matter only after retiring from test cricket.
One presumes that if Khawaja was still a member of the Australian team, then he would remain silent. On the other side, are past and current players who staunchly deny the truth of what Khawaja and Warner allege. They have a vested interest in asserting the truth of what they claim as to do otherwise would have a devastating impact on their personal reputations and the standing of the team.
Australians have been justifiably proud of the achievements of our elite cricketers in the time since the scandal first erupted. Part of our pride lay in the fact that they appeared to demonstrate that one could succeed, at the highest levels, while being ethical. The good that has been done under the leadership of Pat Cummins should be celebrated in its own terms. But how devastating would it be to discover that at the heart of this story lurks a deception.
I had the privilege of leading a team from The Ethics Centre that reviewed and reported on the underlying cultural factors that led to the events that unfolded, before the world’s eyes, at that infamous match at Cape Town. Our Terms of Reference explicitly excluded any investigation of the specific events that led to our enquiry.
Those matters had been investigated by Cricket Australia and the findings were concluded. Even so, we picked up whispers – very few and very faint – that, perhaps, the public record did not tell the full story. Given that we were precluded from straying from our task, the best we could do was circle back to some of those whom we had interviewed to offer them the opportunity to amend their statements about what had occurred.
I am bound by ongoing duties of confidentiality not to name the people with whom I subsequently spoke. All I can say is that if what Usman Khawaja alleges turns out to be true, then I was also lied to. In the face of explicit denials that there was anything more to be said on the matter, we were left with ‘whispers’ … and nothing more.
It is easy enough to understand how a group of players might have decided to perpetuate – either by act or omission – what could turn out to be a lie. Some people may have had only a vague understanding of what was actually afoot (just enough ‘constructive ignorance’ to make plausible deniability a possibility).
Others might have thought that it was for the ‘greater good’ that the price to be paid be limited to three players – a kind of triage in which one amputates a damaged limb in order to save the body as a whole. We may never really know the full range of motivations that led the team to act as they did in the aftermath of Cape Town.
What we do know is that many of those players remain in the Australian men’s cricket team. And one has to assume that the thinking that led to a possible (as yet unproven) ‘cover-up’ remains in place. That is a most troubling thought. Now, as a consequence of what has been alleged, by Usman Khwaja and David Warner, a spotlight is once again being shone into the darker recesses of the culture of elite, men’s cricket.
My fear is that if the lately revealed claims are be proven to be true, then the damage to the game will be at least as great as that caused by the original sin of ball tampering.
In all of this, we should not forget the role played by Cricket Australia. As far as I know, key recommendations made in our report have been set aside without much fanfare. The Australian Cricket Council was meant to bring together key stakeholders to work through complex issues. It appears to be dormant (if not dead).
I was appointed as the inaugural Ethics Commissioner for Australian Cricket. Just one issue was referred to me during my tenure. The period of appointment lapsed a couple of years ago. I do not know if anyone currently fulfils that role.
Most institutions have short memories and find it convenient to ‘turn the page’ or ‘look to the future’ once leadership changes. With a new Chair and CEO at Cricket Australia, I doubt that anyone has looked at our report for contemporary guidance. It is so ‘yesterday’ … but is it?
An edited version of this article originally appeared in Australian Financial Review.
BY Simon Longstaff
Simon Longstaff began his working life on Groote Eylandt in the Northern Territory of Australia. He is proud of his kinship ties to the Anindilyakwa people. After a period studying law in Sydney and teaching in Tasmania, he pursued postgraduate studies as a Member of Magdalene College, Cambridge. In 1991, Simon commenced his work as the first Executive Director of The Ethics Centre. In 2013, he was made an officer of the Order of Australia (AO) for “distinguished service to the community through the promotion of ethical standards in governance and business, to improving corporate responsibility, and to philosophy.” Simon is an Adjunct Professor of the Australian Graduate School of Management at UNSW, a Fellow of CPA Australia, the Royal Society of NSW and the Australian Risk Policy Institute.
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Netflix’s Stanford Prison Experiment deeply unsettled me – but not in the way I expected

Netflix’s Stanford Prison Experiment deeply unsettled me – but not in the way I expected
Opinion + AnalysisSociety + Culture
BY Joseph Earp 10 NOV 2026
It’s only a fool who pretends that they could have predicted that Philip Zimbardo’s infamous psychological study, the Stanford Prison Experiment, would one day end up as a reality TV show.
Then again, in a media landscape where the only way to cut through is to spark think pieces (exactly like this one), perhaps we all should have.
Enter Netflix’s The Stanford Prison Experiment, a six episode show that recreates Zimbardo’s experiment, albeit with a few notable tweaks: throwing an assemblage of strangers into a prison, randomly assigning them the roles of either guard or prisoner, and sitting back and waiting for the fireworks.
The original experiment
There’s reason to expect fireworks, too, given how they famously ended the original experiment. Conducted in August 1971, the original Stanford Prison Experiment was an attempt by Zimbardo to discover “the psychological effects … of becoming a prisoner or prison guard.” He recruited 24 participants and randomly assigned nine of them to be prison guards, and nine to be prisoners (the remaining six were left as standbys). Setting them up in a makeshift prison, he allowed them largely to behave as they wanted. So he said, anyway.
Six days later, Zimbardo ended up calling the whole thing off. He was, he told his fellow psychologists, horrified by the remarkably swift descent into barbarity: guards were wantonly abusing the prisoners, including making them wear bags on their heads and humiliating them.
Such findings were in line with what a different study, the Milgram Experiment, had proved only a decade earlier. In that previous study, average citizens required only the slightest bit of pressure to begin “torturing” strangers, subjecting them to electric shocks when they got quiz answers wrong (the strangers were actually acting, and no electric shocks were given). Both the Milgram Experiment and the Stanford Prison Experiment were therefore designed to prove what mass atrocities like the Holocaust had already apparently taught the world – namely, that we are all only ever one slight and sometimes random poke away from becoming monsters only too happy to torture fellow humans.
Only, it’s not quite clear that Zimbardo’s findings are as conclusive as he initially presented them. As one of the most famous psychology studies ever conducted, The Stanford Prison Experiment has been endlessly picked at, the cleanness of its data questioned: for a start, it’s not entirely true that Zimbardo and his team merely left the prisoners and guards to their own devices.
Some have argued that the guards’ barbarism was subtly encouraged by the researchers; others have noted that the researchers’ initial habit of not stepping in to correct the guards’ behaviour meant it only escalated. Both critiques of the experiment essentially make the same point: that Zimbardo’s fake prison is not the real world, and that its results are therefore not transferable.
The experiment for a new age
To its credit and my considerable surprise, the Netflix version goes some way to avoiding such critiques. When I loaded the show up, I expected the messiest possible version of Zimbardo’s work – maybe Mr Beast might swing in for the finale, I thought, in order to offer a guard a million dollars if they brutalised a prisoner.
But actually, the Netflix show initially strikes one as more comprehensive than Zimbardo’s original work. For a start, participants have been recruited across gender and racial lines – in Zimbardo’s version, they were all men, and almost exclusively white. There are also more stages to the Netflix version, with one stage abruptly swapping the roles of prisoner and guard, to see how those who have been mistreated might react when given the opportunity to mistreat. And then there’s the inclusion of a safeword, allowing participants to halt the experiment themselves, not to mention a team – rather than just Zimbardo and his colleagues – sitting on the sidelines to dissect what we’re seeing.
Initially, these additional layers impressed me. The cynical part of my brain noted that all these measures make for better TV, and were probably designed to that end, rather than to produce cleaner data – it’s hard to imagine that Netflix were motivated to greenlight a show by the desire to best a psychologist in the matter of academic rigour.
But even though I grumbled, I found myself swept along by the content, particularly when it came to the ending, which (spoiler alert) sees the prisoners form a collective mass who elect to end the experiment as one. What a balm, I thought to myself. Rather than the violent pessimism of Zimbardo’s original experiment, what the show ended up proving was the solidarity of the oppressed – not disharmony, but the power we have to unite ourselves.
Barbarism as spectacle, but make it ironic
Then I thought about it some more. And some more after that. Along the way, I found myself thinking, not for the first time recently, of the defining quality of our age – self-awareness. We’re in the era of post-post irony. Our onscreen heroes not only know they’re characters in a movie: we know that they know. Our thinking these days is inherently third-personal; we’re always considering how things might seem, and how we might interpret how they seem, and then how that interpretation itself might get interpreted by others.
In essence, we know that the base impulse to watch a restaging of an experiment where people are awful to one another is a base impulse. And the executives at Netflix definitely know a version of the Zimbardo experiment that ends positively makes more headlines than a version that ends exactly how the original one does.
What this show does, therefore, is seek to absolve you for watching depraved content by assuring you that it understands the idea of a Stanford Prison Experiment show is depraved content. It has its cake and eats it too: you get to watch all the titillating promise of people mistreating one another, and then you get the moral absolution of an ending in which the participants (almost literally) walk into the sunset. You the viewer are thus not only better than the guards – you’re better even than Zimbardo, who put them there in the first place. This time, the show says, we got it right.
But perhaps that’s around the moment where your brain reminds you that we don’t get it right out in the real world, which is not akin to either Zimbardo’s experiment, or Netflix content. Whether or not the prison system is unjust in psychological simulations might be unclear; it’s certainly clear that it’s unjust in Australia, where minorities are routinely unfairly imprisoned and killed.
There’s a lot of good reasons to be suspicious of Zimbardo’s original findings. There are even more reasons to be suspicious of the neat, calming resolution of a Netflix adaptation of those findings.
Zimbardo freaked us out by suggesting that barbarism lies always in our hearts, waiting for its moment. Netflix says: nobody really means each other harm.
In an era of unspeakable violence, both implicit and explicit, that latter conclusion – particularly when packaged and delivered by a company with a net worth of $279.1 billion USD – might be the most dangerous of them all.

BY Joseph Earp
Joseph Earp is a poet, journalist and philosophy student. He is currently undertaking his PhD at the University of Sydney, studying the work of David Hume.
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On Helen Haines

My association with the Federal Electorate of Indi and its independent representatives dates back to the early days when Cathy McGowan first emerged as a candidate being supported by grass roots community members.
My doctoral research, at Cambridge, had focused on core questions to do with the theory and practice of democracy. And it was to discuss those issues that I was first invited to speak at a series of public meetings – open to people of all political persuasions – that had grown out of the original set of kitchen table conversations that first animated the campaign for an independent, community representative to Canberra.
I have stayed in touch with Indi and its representatives ever since and was delighted to find in Helen Haines a person with a deep commitment to democracy – not just as a system of governance but more importantly as the political expression of fundamental ethical principles without which no democracy can flourish.
I want to stress this point. There are some politicians who are quite brilliant in their capacity to work the machinery of politics – without any real sense of the higher purpose that the machinery is supposed to serve. No doubt, they play their role. However, I have always reserved my admiration for those who understand politics to be about much more than the contest for power. For what use is power if you have no greater purpose than to hold and exercise it for its own sake.
Helen Haines has always understood that ethics and politics are two sides of the same coin. As Aristotle would have it, ethics requires us to consider what is the ‘good life’ for a person, while politics contemplates what makes for a ‘good life’ for a society. It is for this reason that Helen has always been at the forefront of campaigns to strengthen the ethical foundations of our society. I know from years of experience that this is not a popular cause. There are plenty of people who are happy enough to offer rhetorical support for ethics. Far fewer will make a tangible investment in the ethical infrastructure that holds our society together.
Helen always backs the tangible – lending her support wherever we can. Now she is the victim of a predictable unravelling of society when it loses the skill to disagree constructively, when values and principles are sacrificed for expediency, when the ‘end justifies the means’, when winning is pursued at any cost.
Many years ago, I wrote what I hoped might become something like a Hippocratic Oath for politicians. The language is a little old-fashioned… but the second paragraph of this preamble offers a tragic premonition of what has happened to Helen:
As originally conceived, the practice of politics is intended to be a noble calling; the arena within which a citizen might contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a good society.
Yet, without voluntary, ethical restraint, the pursuit and exercise of power risks becoming personal, brutal and self-serving; coarsening the polity, bringing public institutions into disrepute and damaging the common good.
In every election where Helen Haines has stood as a candidate, she has made the Politicians’ Pledge to the people of Indi. She is one of very few who has done so. Why? Because Helen believes in the possibility of a nobility in politics. She knows the danger, facing to us all, when ethical restraint is abandoned.
No person should have to suffer the consequences of our failure, as a nation, to invest even a fraction of our resources in the ethical infrastructure upon which we all rely. No person… and especially not Helen Haines.
Image: James Ross, AAP Image

BY Simon Longstaff
Simon Longstaff began his working life on Groote Eylandt in the Northern Territory of Australia. He is proud of his kinship ties to the Anindilyakwa people. After a period studying law in Sydney and teaching in Tasmania, he pursued postgraduate studies as a Member of Magdalene College, Cambridge. In 1991, Simon commenced his work as the first Executive Director of The Ethics Centre. In 2013, he was made an officer of the Order of Australia (AO) for “distinguished service to the community through the promotion of ethical standards in governance and business, to improving corporate responsibility, and to philosophy.” Simon is an Adjunct Professor of the Australian Graduate School of Management at UNSW, a Fellow of CPA Australia, the Royal Society of NSW and the Australian Risk Policy Institute.
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When money, power and AI collide, can lawyers uphold ethics?

When money, power and AI collide, can lawyers uphold ethics?
Opinion + AnalysisBusiness + LeadershipPolitics + Human Rights
BY Bret Walker 14 OCT 2026
Twenty years ago, Bret Walker AO SC asked hard questions about lawyers and money – particularly about how the legal profession’s transformation into “business for profit” threatened traditional ethical values. Today, with the proliferation of AI and leaders internationally threatening the rule of law, those questions have become even more urgent. Can lawyers still defend democracy or have they become part of the problem?
The last two decades have produced some differently inflected outcomes in the ecology of lawyers in the economy. Although the fundamentals are constant, the rule of law and its struggle against error, dishonesty, and their motivating bases of greed and power, is a composite of very considerable human force.
When unbridled political power clashes with the professional duties of ethical lawyers, who are trying to make a good living in the markets for their services – bad things happen that good people should resist. However, this is much more easily said than done.
The Trump administration’s abuse of its capacity – to wield power as a customer, as a prosecutor, and as an informal regulator of legal practice – is deplorable. Clients must be able to hire and fire their chosen lawyers at will, for good or bad reasons. We have no right to be retained. Mind you, a government’s wilful, and ultimately wasteful counterproductive firing of good lawyers, and hiring of charlatans in their place ought to arouse an outcry against its corrupt diversion of public money. Abuse of the power to investigate suspected crime and prosecute it is a notorious habit of authoritarians throughout history and around the globe. It’s a shame to be witnessing it in a supposed constitutional democracy. And spurious rules imposed by social media and political figures that restrict free speech or policy choices – especially those related to diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) – are being used to punish big law firms. That all adds to the oppression. As does the campaign to punish lawyers for their temerity in having advised or represented the president’s foes, real or imagined.
The ‘money imperative’ lying on big firms explains the scandalous extremes of the Trump administration’s malign influence on these prominent lawyers in the United States. For example, the current resolution of the tensions in question requires these big firms to donate – as if by way of protection money, which are mislabelled ‘pro bono services to the administration’ to be deployed at the command of the President and his henchman in the White House. So, how does this mess implicate lawyers and money? Because it appears that but for the financial disaster intentionally threatened by the Trump’s attack on the big firms, many, and maybe most of them would have repudiated the attempt and refused to grovel. Enough partners protested and resigned, and enough young lawyers were appalled, and also resigned, to indicate there still values of honour and professional pride that can produce the proper stream of resistance to the political abuse of lawyers.
Principles or survival presents a choice none of us can lightly confront. We should feel great sympathy for the leaders of big firms who must have known that knuckling under would see them branded as cowards. And that defiance might require life altering career changes. This dilemma is massively worsened by the sheer scale of big firm operations. Whatever the advantages of big firm operations it is in this case, a Faustian bargain.
Now I want to turn to the provocative letters ‘AI’ and its impact on lawyers, clients and the administration of justice. If ‘A’ is the opposite of real, they could be read as a plain confession of inferiority to human intelligence. If ‘I’ is intelligence in the sense of knowledge as in the expression ‘criminal intelligence’, which refers to information available to police, not the brain power of criminals, then we are well aware of the inherent weakness of intelligence in that sense. Because it is far closer in resemblance to mere belief or suspicion than to actual, let alone, demonstrable, knowledge.
One thing is clear. The words ‘wisdom’ and its subsidiary concept ‘judgement’ are not at all entailed in AI. History suggests we should not disdain the fact that an intellectual resource is artificial. To the contrary, reading and writing are at the pinnacle of our species artificial achievements, as well as tools. So is law, which both predates and flourishes with literacy. So is government, as shown by its myriad forms and its constant plasticity. In ordinary legal practice, indices, digests, and treatises are all artificial aids to professional intelligence, in both main senses of the word. They do help us to think, to argue and to resolve the problems our clients bring to us.
My comments are not directed to the innocent use, entirely beneficial, of digital resources for collating and retrieving the mass of written materials that are the stuff of legal practice. On the other hand, the use of so-called precedents for written legal work – whether they’re contracts or pleadings, opinions or advice on evidence, or reasons for judgement– is well understood to have inherent hazards. By their nature, precedents either oversimplify or overcomplicate. They are not custom made. They are difficult to adapt to the individual and particular facts and circumstances of a matter requiring legal services being a matter unknown before the precedent was devised. And precedents hinder innovation designedly.
AI as a generator of fully expressed legal analysis and advice is simply wrong. No financial dimension or consequence alleviates that condition. AI perverts its useful purposes. The profession doesn’t need a digital prompt to prepare advice which identifies the issues, the client’s aim, the material facts, the applicable law, the attendant risks, or the possible outcomes and prospects. Unless the profession of course is lazy, or worse, has an inclination to pretence.
I have no time for the idiotic notion of AI-generated submissions or evidence such as affidavits in the courts. But with submissions, we must remember how we make them – not only by the formation of judgement, but by the obtaining of knowledge of relevant facts and law. They are conscious of the client’s individual circumstances and vulnerabilities. And above all, we make them in compliance with our ethical duties of candour and participation in the administration of justice. Which is not a sporting contest, let alone an electronic game. When it comes to the scandal of ‘AI hallucinations’ – which in my view, is too kind a label – that invent phoney cases as authorities and fictitious statutory provisions, I’m sure the coders and others, who for financial return are responsible for the algorithms that produce such garbage, surely did not specifically instruct the processes to those ends. But how do these features of AI exist and persist in this aspect of legal practice? We can probably blame large language models (LLM). Which is not a further degree obtained from a university, but models that trawl existing publications and conduct pattern recognition for loosely described predictive results. But patterns are a construct of observation, and they are constantly changing in hard science. And predictions are always a mixture of chance and falsity.
AI can’t stand in for ethical legal work any more than pre-digital resources such as indices and treatises. No amount of financial incentive of savings, enhanced revenue or increased profit margin can say anything to the contrary of that proposition.
So what is the legal profession to do? Do we supplant, supplement, or sharpen the tools that we presently have, over and above the latest Court commandments which have wielded an already salutary effect in the profession, against the absurdly overhyped use of AI in the administration of justice? I have a modest proposal that invokes a modest slogan of user pays. In this case, the misuser pays. Apart from being struck off, any lawyer who misleads a court, opponent or client, by misusing AI in place of their own research, thought and articulation of the result of those processes, should also play full indemnity costs personally for all the time and trouble wasted by that delinquency, and of course, partnership and vicarious liability as appropriate within firms. This approach is easily imaginable. It’s quite feasible in the realm of litigation where the peremptory and condign visiting of costs consequences on misbehaving lawyers is a healthy and old tradition. It’s more difficult in non-contentious work as there aren’t clear ways to recover costs. However current statutory disciplinary proceedings may accommodate some compensation. But it’s time, for the profession to devise and to propose to government a concerted approach to ensure that there is no continuing financial benefit for lawyers misusing AI in any kind of work. This idea opens the possibility that a non-delegable duty might arise from ordinary common law duties of care which would treat the promulgation of AI with its inherent feature of hallucinations – truly to be known as lies – as just another form of ‘snails in the bottle’.
After all, resorting to LLM is a resort to the mass-assembled, collated and analysed verbiage of humans. Humans, being the species of animal which lies. That propensity is known. AI’s risks are obviously foreseeable. It could be described in terms recognisable from Rylands v Fletcher – the territory is obviously inherently dangerous. The liability should follow in near absolute terms. But that contention, which seeks to embrace AI and money and not merely lawyers and money, is one which is beyond my remit.
This is an abridged version of Bret Walker AO SC’s speech, Lawyers and Money, 20 Years Later.

BY Bret Walker
Bret Walker has been a barrister practising at the NSW Bar since 1979 and was appointed Senior Counsel in 1993 and Queen’s Counsel in 1994. He is a Foundation Fellow of the Australian Academy of Law. He was the inaugural Independent National Security Legislation Monitor from 2011-2014 and has been a member of the NSW Health Clinical Ethics Advisory Panel and a director of the Sydney Writers Festival.
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You’re probably doing the wrong thing (and that’s okay)

You’re probably doing the wrong thing (and that’s okay)
Opinion + AnalysisSociety + Culture
BY Daniel Finlay 13 OCT 2026
10 years ago, I didn’t pick up litter I saw on the beach. At most, I might bury it or throw it farther up onto the sand away from the water and dust my hands of responsibility.
Being good is both harder and, more importantly, easier than you think. You’ve probably heard the aphorism “Perfect is the enemy of the good” or something similar to it. In popular culture, there is a general idea that having lofty goals (“aiming for perfection”) is counterproductive because it dissuades people from making incremental positive change by casting aside anything but achieving The Ultimate Goal as “not good enough”.
This is demonstrated clearly in conversations about politics. For example, if the Greens have a goal, it’s likely that Labor’s bill will get about 50% of the way there. Sometimes, the Greens will block the bill by abstaining (preventing the government from obtaining a majority vote to pass) and use their vote to bargain for further changes. This is about the time when criticisms start being levelled, by citizens and politicians alike, that perfection is getting in the way of progress. Why impede something good getting done?
The reason lots of people fall into this simplification is because we are very practiced at doing it to ourselves. That is, when we subconsciously recognise that the most ethical option in any given situation is also a bit more effort or complicated than we’d like, this cognitive dissonance often results in a sort of “moral settling” where we convince ourselves that the next best option is good enough. This is, importantly, despite being capable of doing the best option.
I think, therefore I try
What does it mean to be capable of doing something? I mentioned that being good is both harder and easier than you think. It’s easier in the sense that most of our everyday moral choices are not difficult in practicality. For most people, it’s not physically demanding or complex to pick up litter, wear a mask, go to an op-shop, not yell at people, buy less meat, or even research the effects of your everyday choices.
However, it can be very psychologically demanding – at least in the short term. Reshaping mental and physical habits is difficult, especially when we are bombarded with messaging that makes incremental change feel like irredeemable failure.
Over time, I’ve slowly decided that something is better than nothing – that making small improvements is better than giving in to the hopelessness you might feel when you consider the gap between your current behaviour and what you think is most ethical.
Many years later, I’m now in the habit of leaving the beach with two fistfuls of rubbish.
The habit has also extended to other places, so I’ll often find myself picking up rubbish on the way to the station or on my lunch break in the park. I still give myself excuses – maybe there’s too much, or maybe it’s too far away from a bin – but to me the important thing is that I am slowly but surely changing my habits in a positive way.
Shoot for the moon and even if you miss, you’ll land among the stars
As far as aphorisms go, I like this one better. Especially in the personal realm, we should be aiming to be the best versions of ourselves and recognising that failure to meet high moral standards is only a problem if we let it lead us into apathy. We shouldn’t be aiming to be perfect, but we should be aiming for perfect.
Rather than thinking of perfection as some universally applicable state of being, we should instead think of our own personal conceptions of perfection as a compass.
What values and principles underlie the best version of yourself? If you can’t achieve them all in one go, how can you make changes in your behaviour and habits to encourage growth in that direction?
Incidentally, this is one of my favourite things about consequentialism (the category of ethical frameworks that prioritise outcomes): it allows for personal circumstances and psychological inability. Sometimes the best action to take in an objective view might be something that’s too difficult for a person in that moment. But it also demands that we consciously develop the moral motivation to change our habits and psychology such that we can eventually overcome those inabilities and make our future decisions better.
I’ll leave you with the words of Michael Schur from his book How to Be Perfect:
“To demand perfection, or to hold people to impossible standards, is to deny the simple and beautiful reality that nobody is perfect … there will be plenty of times when you do not flourish.
[But] if you’ve tried to do something good a thousand times and you’ve failed a thousand times, and the people around you are miserable, and you’re at the end of your rope, and you’re losing faith in yourselves, you know what we want you to do then?
Keep trying, keep trying, keep trying.”

BY Daniel Finlay
Daniel is a philosopher, writer and editor. He works at The Ethics Centre as Youth Engagement Coordinator, supporting and developing the futures of young Australians through exposure to ethics.
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Should criminals get access to medical benefits while in prison?

Should criminals get access to medical benefits while in prison?
Opinion + AnalysisHealth + Wellbeing
BY Tim Dean 17 SEP 2026
It can feel galling to see convicted criminals get access to high level health care services while in prison. But there are good reasons why the justice system ensures basic health care for all.
In September 2026 it was reported that convicted murderer, Erin Patterson, who served lethal death cap mushrooms to her in-laws, had been approved to receive the weight loss drug, Ozempic. The news triggered outrage in some circles that a convicted criminal was receiving what was perceived as medical benefits at taxpayers’ expense while in prison.
Patterson is not the only case of convicted criminals receiving medical benefits while incarcerated. Bradley Murdoch, who was serving a life sentence for the 2001 murder of backpacker Peter Falconio, received extensive treatment for terminal throat cancer, and received palliative care, where he was allowed out on excursions in his dying days.
Then there’s Alicia Schiller, who sought access to IVF while serving a 16 year sentence for the murder of mother-of-four, Tyrelle Evertsen-Mostert. While the court gave her permission to access the services at her own expense, several IVF clinics refused to provide services to Schiller, who ultimately withdrew her application. On the other hand, drug trafficker and organised crime figure, Dale David Williams, was given permission to take part in IVF, subsequently fathering a child with his parter, who was living outside of prison.
These cases raise the question of what benefits should be afforded to convicted criminals while they are in prison? Is it fair that people who have committed serious – sometimes heinous – crimes, be given access to medical treatments taxpayer expense? Or would it be committing a further injustice to deny them access to health care?
Moral dissonance
It’s entirely natural that when we see someone commit a serious moral offence that we want to see them punished. It’s a deep-rooted aspect of our nature. Just hearing about someone harming others is enough to trigger strong feelings of outrage. And outrage, by its nature, motivates us to censure the wrongdoer, often by inflicting harm back upon them in retribution or revenge. This is one of the core psychological mechanisms that helped our distant ancestors regulate problematic behaviour in small-scale societies over hundreds of thousands of years, and we still carry that tendency with us today.
So when we see a wrongdoer apparently receiving some benefit or perk, like access to IVF or palliative care, or we see those whom we deem responsible for their punishment showing leniency, it can trigger a kind of moral dissonance. It can be hard to stomach the idea that a wrongdoer could gain any help from whose who are supposed to be punishing them for their crimes.
However, as a society, we have decided that unilateral retribution or revenge are no longer the ways we deal with serious crime. Instead of leaving justice in the hands of the victims, we have outsourced justice to the state. The idea is that impartial policing and courts, which (in principle) follow set procedures and are subject to strict oversight, are better placed to mete out justice than individuals or groups that are driven by indignation or outrage. In fact, we have made unilateral punishment of wrongdoing, in the form of vigilantism, itself a crime.
And over the decades, we have slowly changed how we think the state ought to punish wrongdoers. Gone is a fixation on retribution, along with the “cruel and unusual” punishments of ages past, including public shaming, humiliation, exile, or inflicting physical pain. In their place, is a more consequentialist approach to punishment, one that seeks to deter crime, rehabilitate wrongdoers where possible, and provide public safety by locking them behind bars.
In fact, the primary form of punishment for serious crime today is the deprivation of liberty. In a liberal society that is based on the freedom of individuals to live their life as they choose, stripping them of that freedom is deemed sufficient censure for their crimes.
Part of this shift in punishment is also motivated by a belief that all people – even serious wrongdoers – have a baseline of basic human rights that must be respected, such as a right to a fair trial, dignity and access to basic needs, like food, water shelter and health care.
Also that the state has a duty of care to anyone in its care, even prisoners. This is why, in the cases above, the official justifications for providing access to health care were not on the basis of whether the prisoners ‘deserved’ it, but on the expert opinion of medical professionals based entirely on physical and mental health concerns.
This doesn’t mean there can’t still be reasonable disagreement over what kinds of medical treatments prisoners ought to have access to. There is difference between life-saving treatments for things like cancer or a stroke and discretionary treatments, such as cosmetic surgery. Although things can get a bit muddier when considering things like weight loss drugs. On the one hand, these are often perceived to be luxuries, but they are also used to prevent serious health issues, such as diabetes – and the taxpayer might end up footing a significantly higher bill for the latter.
The justice system is far from perfect, and can often run counter to our intuitions. It’s understandable that many people are outraged at the prospect of seeing criminals receive health benefits while in prison. But if we believe that all people should be treated with a baseline level of dignity, and that the state has a duty of care to anyone in its protection, then we should be cautious about calling for even hardened criminals to be denied basic health care.

BY Tim Dean
Tim is the Resident Philosopher at The Ethics Centre, where he holds the Manos Chair of Ethics, and is an Honorary Associate at the University of Sydney. He has a Doctorate in philosophy from the University of New South Wales on the evolution of morality and specialises in ethics, public philosophy and critical thinking. He is the author of How We Became Human and has worked as an editor and writer for media outlets including The Conversation, Cosmos and Australian Life Scientist. He is the recipient of the Australasian Association of Philosophy Media Professionals’ Award for his work on philosophy in the public sphere. He has delivered workshops for businesses, NFPs and governments across Australia and Asia, including Facebook, Commonwealth Bank, KPMG, Sydney Opera House, Art Gallery of NSW, Clayton Utz, RSPCA, state and local governments, and many others.
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How should we decide between the art and the artist?

How should we decide between the art and the artist?
Opinion + AnalysisSociety + Culture
BY Ariel Bai 16 SEP 2026
You are engrossed in reading a beloved novel when a staggering headline about its author appears on your phone. Or perhaps your favourite song comes on shuffle, only to remind you of the controversy surrounding the musician who created it. Gradually, an action that once felt effortless becomes somewhat dissonant.
In an age where artists’ personal identities are increasingly publicised, this conflict between personal enjoyment and ethical discomfort affects nearly all of us as consumers of media. From J.K. Rowling’s controversial views on transgender issues, Kanye West’s antisemitic remarks, to confirmed charges against R. Kelly, discussions arise about whether it is desirable to separate our support for the art from its creator.
These debates often fall into a false binary; we either divorce the art from the artist entirely or outright reject both.
The first option risks overlooking the ways our consumption continues to multidimensionally benefit an artist through financial support and cultural visibility. Yet, the second may neglect the independent significance that art can acquire in the lives of its audience. As French literary critic Roland Barthes proposed in The Death of the Author, the meaning of a work is partly determined by personal engagement and not solely by its creator. Books, songs and films often become attached to one’s intimate memories, making total rejection a loss of something emotionally significant.
The difficulty lies in that neither complete separation nor rejection leaves enough room for nuance. Maybe instead we should focus on what ethical responsibilities we have as consumers when engaging with the works of controversial artists.
Rather than seeking a single answer, we need a framework that helps us distinguish between and evaluate different forms of support. Such a framework can be found in consequentialist and deontological ethics.
Why consequences matter
Consequentialism is the ethical perspective that actions should be judged primarily by their outcomes. Applied to the art and artist dilemma, this viewpoint redirects the attention away from abstract questions and towards the practical effects of our consumption. What impact does one’s engagement have on the artist’s wealth, influence and public platform?
Financial support is the most visible dimension as money flows directly from people’s purchases to the creator or their associated industries. Yet, symbolic support is just as significant. Attention and traction itself are a form of currency in algorithmic contemporary media. Repeated streaming of a song or the sharing of a post increases its cultural relevance and signals to platforms that the subject generates interest.
Consider the case of J.K. Rowling.
The Harry Potter franchise creates significant ongoing commercial and cultural value through many products and experiences. At the same time, Rowling’s public comments on transgender issues and financial backing of these views have sparked widespread criticism. This led many readers to question whether further engagement with the franchise will allow her rhetoric to reach a larger audience. When those views contribute to a climate of exclusion and hostility towards transgender people and actual changes in law, supporting Rowling’s influence as a consumer may carry societal consequences beyond individual acts of consumption.
A comparable dynamic can be illustrated in the music industry. Following Kanye West’s reported antisemitic remarks on social media, on the news and in his music in 2022, major companies including Adidas severed ties with him and quoted his comments as “unacceptable, hateful and dangerous”. However, institutional responses alone do not undermine an artist’s influence long-term. In April 2026, two sold-out Kanye performances in Los Angeles reportedly grossed more than USD$33 million. Here, individual consumption driving demand for his concert becomes ethically impactful, since it generates large-scale cultural relevance, further financial gain and trivialises the harmful impact of his influence.
Choosing with awareness
This outcome-driven viewpoint illuminates an important distinction – not all forms of engagement carry the same consequences. We can consider our choices along a spectrum of ethical responsibility.
At one end of the spectrum are forms of engagement that provide little or no new support to the creator. On a personal scale, revisiting Harry Potter as a childhood favourite already sitting on your bookshelf allows appreciation of the work without contributing to Rowling’s current brand. At the other end are forms of consumption that reinforce an artist’s influence more directly. Attending expensive paid events or heavily promoting Kanye content online help sustain the foundational systems that keep the artist influential.
The more active the support, the stronger ethical justification it requires.
Limits of artistic appreciation
Nevertheless, if one’s engagement gives the artist no meaningful profit or influence – for example, if they are decreased and their estate does not continue their wrongdoing – does it automatically make consumption ethically permissible? Irrespective of consequences, deontological ethics judge the right or wrong of an action based on principles, rights and duties.
Famous American singer R. Kelly was convicted of offences involving sexual exploitation and forced labour in 2021. Prosecutors proved that he used his fame to recruit and exploit victims. The documentary Surviving R. Kelly allows female victims to recount their experiences. Their testimonies provide evidence of the wrongs committed against these women, which gives audiences reason to consider a change in behaviour, such as boycotting his music, regardless of the artistic appreciation or personal enjoyment his art may provide.
From a deontological perspective, audiences have a duty to support victims and to withdraw support from perpetrators, rather than allowing artistic talent to excuse conduct that violates fundamental rights.
As active participants in contemporary culture, the relationship between art and the artist will always remain complicated. By recognising that every stream contributes to a dynamic of attention and social power, we must realise that our daily choices are not trivial. Ethical consumption begins when we start consciously asking what our engagement with a work means for the world around us and what it reflects about ourselves.

BY Ariel Bai
Ariel is a year 11 student currently attending Ravenswood. Passionate about understanding people and the world around her, she enjoys exploring contemporary and social issues through her writing. Her interest in current global trends and human experiences prompted her to craft this piece.
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Research shows ethics education teaches kids right from wrong. Why can so few students access it?

Research shows ethics education teaches kids right from wrong. Why can so few students access it?
Opinion + AnalysisSociety + Culture
BY Michael Noetel Geetanjali Basarkod 3 SEP 2026
How important is it that kids learn to tell right from wrong?
Businessman and former university chancellor David Gonski recently called for ethics classes to be rolled out in all Australian schools to boost social cohesion.
At the moment, ethics does not get dedicated time in the school curriculum.
Some might argue children don’t need school ethics classes if they already learn ethics from their parents and other adults in their lives.
But our research shows formal ethics education can make a difference. In the largest ever review on the subject, we found teaching ethics can improve students’ ability to reason through ethical issues and prioritise doing the right thing.
Ethics education in Australia
Ethics has been part of the national Australian Curriculum for more than a decade. It sits alongside literacy, numeracy and four other subjects as a “general capability”. This means it’s a cross-curriculum skill every Australian child is supposed to learn in all subjects.
So in theory, ethics education is the responsibility of all teachers, even when teaching mathematics, art or biology.
In practice, no-one is responsible for teaching these skills. Australian research has found even teachers who value general capabilities, such as ethics, struggle to teach them explicitly. This is because the focus is on what gets tested. In turn, this means “the intentions of the Australian Curriculum […] are not being realised”.
In most Australian states, the only structured ethics offering in schools is during religious instruction. But these are only optional lessons, and families who want a secular alternative are often left without it.
Our study
We synthesised 92 randomised controlled trials – the most rigorous form of evidence in education. Together, the studies involved 12,693 students from primary school through to university.
The studies covered 20 countries, including Australia, and spanned nearly five decades.
Of those 92 randomised trials, 54 compared students receiving ethics lessons to those in control groups who did not learn ethics. The other studies compared different types of ethics instruction against each other.
The studies with control groups tell us how well students currently learn ethics without dedicated classes (such as from their parents or through other generalised learning at school).
What we found
Students who received formal ethics education were better able to recognise ethical issues (also called “moral sensitivity”), gave better reasons about the right thing to do (“moral judgement”) and wanted to prioritise doing the right thing (“moral motivation”).
Four in five trials showed meaningful positive effects in these areas.
Our study did not measure kids’ actual behaviour over the long run. But we know higher moral reasoning capacity is associated with being more likely to help others and resist peer pressure. It is also associated with lower levels of juvenile delinquency.
We also found how you teach ethics matters.
Programs built around student discussion worked well. Programs built around lectures and readings alone did not, like in most subjects. You learn better when you can explain your thinking, safely make mistakes, and get feedback.
This is why ethics is so good to learn in schools: you can have discussions with peers and educators in a way that’s hard for most parents to reproduce at home.
Some Australian states do this well…
New South Wales already has a model for teaching ethics.
The free Primary Ethics program runs in about 500 NSW schools and reaches roughly 40,000 students each week using trained volunteers. Its curriculum is built around small groups, working through questions such as “Is it ever okay to break a promise?”
This is the kind of structured discussion our research identified as most effective for teaching ethics.
Primary Ethics runs during the same time slot as religious instruction lessons. It was introduced because growing numbers of students were opting out of religious classes, but had nothing meaningful to do instead. The classes are free because they’re delivered by trained volunteers.
… but most don’t
Dedicated ethics classes are patchy in other states. For example, Queensland and Western Australia have class time for religious instruction but there is no secular alternative. Students just get “other instruction” during this time.
Other states would need to amend their laws to allow (not require) secular ethics as a formal alternative to religious instruction, exactly as NSW did in 2010.
No new funding or teachers would be needed. If they run at the same time as religious instruction, there is already space in the school week for these classes.
New volunteers would be needed to run the discussions, but NSW has shown there’s a willing contingent of people who can deliver the program when the lesson plans are already prepared for them.
A more ambitious approach
A more ambitious change would be to treat ethics as a core subject in its own right, as in France and Finland.
This could mean having ethics education on the timetable, right alongside maths and languages. Every student would be taught by a trained specialist teacher, instead of asking trained volunteers or other teachers to cover it.
Our review showed ethics education helps at every level of schooling.
Which model works best is still an open question; whether to make room for one arguably is not.
We make time for maths, sport and music because we think they matter for a good life. If knowing right from wrong matters at least as much, it has earned at least a little time on the timetable.
This article was originally published in The Conversation.

BY Michael Noetel
Michael is an academic working at the intersection of psychology, evidence synthesis, and AI governance. He creates effective, scalable educational programs. That content is designed to help people make better decisions, become more empathic, more active, and more effective in their work.
BY Geetanjali Basarkod
Dr. Geetanjali Basarkod is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Positive Psychology and Education (IPPE), Sydney, Australia. Her research focuses on understanding how to create inclusive environments in which young people can thrive and reach their full potential.
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5 things we learnt from Festival of Dangerous Ideas 2026

5 things we learnt from Festival of Dangerous Ideas 2026
Opinion + AnalysisSociety + Culture
BY The Ethics Centre 1 SEP 2026
Across 10 days, 13 iconic venues and 115 sessions this year’s Festival of Dangerous Ideas explored hatred, belonging, nationhood, conspiracy, faith and equality.
Here are 5 things we learnt from the Festival in 2026:
You cannot have agency if you live in an environment where you are insidiously manipulated
Filipino journalist and 2021 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Ressa argues the rise of Donald Trump and populist authoritarians worldwide is no anomaly. It’s the product of an information ecosystem built to amplify the worst of our nature, and divide and manipulate us. Data shows Trump, Jair Bolsonaro and Rodrigo Duterte likely wouldn’t have been elected without algorithms boosting their visibility and credibility. Platforms built to keep us scrolling let lies outrun facts, and AI is compounding the problem, crowding out trusted human sources altogether. Without a check on power, authoritarianism walks through unchallenged – and Ressa warns the same could happen here, in Australia.
We must get off the big tech platforms and move to “public interest tech”, such as her own Rappler news website and other sites run by the people, not by tech billionaires. Rebuilding trust means choosing real conversations with real humans over algorithms designed to keep us apart.
The greatest wisdom is crossing the distance to listen
In a packed room, Jewish-American journalist Peter Beinart opened his session Facing Moral Wreckage with an unexpected expression of gratitude – not for those who agreed with him, but for those who didn’t. “Equality is the antithesis of bigotry,” he says, and he extends that principle even to those he disagrees with most. In a world where we increasingly curate our information feeds and conversations to confirm what we already believe, Beinart argues the most radical thing we can do is choose to listen to someone we disagree with. “The people who go the furthest distance to listen to different points of view show the greatest wisdom.”
We didn’t lose our privacy, it was taken at scale
Digital rights activist Cory Doctorow unpacks the forces driving the “enshittification” of the platforms we’ve come to rely on – and how far the rot now reaches.
Take “algorithmic wage discrimination”, where American hospitals, keen to avoid unionised staff, increasingly contract nurses through apps that act as an “Uber for nursing.” Before a nurse accepts a shift, the app checks a data broker for their credit card debt. And the more they owe, the lower the wage they’re offered. These apps exist to strip away workplace protections and squeeze workers down to the lowest wage they’ll accept, Doctorow says – and the privacy invasion that makes it possible is entirely legal. Labour protections are weak, but privacy protections are weaker.
This isn’t an accident, Doctorow argues, but the result of a concentrated, wildly profitable surveillance industry that has monetised the abuse of human rights at scale – drawing a direct line from Silicon Valley to nurses whose wages shrink because they can’t make a credit card payment.
“Tech companies aren’t spying on you because privacy is dead. Google spies on you for the same reason a dog licks its balls: because it can, and no one makes them stop.”
The banality of equality is what makes it dangerous
Equality requires us to fully recognise how much we have in common with even those very different or very far from us. Professor of history and author Ussama Makdisi says that this very simple concept is so self-evident that it is often completely overlooked.
The Middle East, as it is known in the Western world today, is too often seen through the lens of turmoil, religious fundamentalism, war, endless conflicts – but, Makdisi urges us to realise, this is both a harmfully reductive characterisation of the region today and a historically inaccurate characterisation of the region’s history.
By drawing on the intrinsic humanity of the people in these regions, Makdisi shows they had both a richer and more peaceful co-existence prior to colonisation. If we are to ever to reach relative peace again, we must be truthful about this past and recognise the way that populations are dehumanised through ahistoric cultural representations.
Not all dangerous ideas are easy to see
Many people expect danger to come from the furthest fringes of politics or culture, or to immediately outrage us. But we live in a rapidly changing world, filled with overlapping crises, competing truths and profound uncertainty – one where the forces shaping our lives are increasingly interconnected and difficult to see.
This year’s program expanded beyond talks and panels, and into arts, films, excursions and banned books – showing how real danger lies in confronting the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to be. It means resisting simplistic narratives and probing beneath the surface. It means recognising that we may inhabit the same world while experiencing it in radically different ways.
As Festival Director Danielle Harvey says: “The most dangerous ideas are not the ones that offend us – it’s the ones we are wilfully ignoring.”
Catch up on select 2026 sessions, on demand now.
Photo by Ken Leanfore

BY The Ethics Centre
The Ethics Centre is a not-for-profit organisation developing innovative programs, services and experiences, designed to bring ethics to the centre of professional and personal life.
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