Close-up of a horse's hooves and legs galloping on sandy ground, kicking up dust, with protective leg boots

We are all responsible for the horse in the skip bin

Horse legs with black protective boots and horseshoes landing on loose dirt, tail swishing as dust flies

On Monday 16 November, a racehorse was found dumped in a landfill skip bin. The horse was a five-year-old named So You Are who finished eighth in the Melbourne Cup just a few weeks prior and was euthanised by a vet two days before being found after unresolvable medical complications.

To me, this news is as horrifying as it is unsurprising. But most frustrating of all is some of the media coverage of the situation.

When certain public kinds of animal abuse happen, people like to treat them as anomalies. We are shocked, appalled, outraged, that such a corruption of our humanity could occur. We hear from people inside and outside industry lamenting the unfair and undignified treatment of these poor souls and calling for the head of the guilty.

In this case, the horse’s trainer was quick to voice his love and grief at the disrespect of the burial. “He was a much-loved horse, and he deserved to be treated with dignity and respect after his death.” Much of the public shares this disappointment about the treatment of the body after death.

The problem with this is that it is not an anomaly; it is an inevitable outcome of an unethical system of exploitation masquerading as sport, entertainment and profit.

From my perspective, the way that So You Are’s body was treated matters mostly as a reflection of industry and societal attitudes towards animals, and less so as the one-off barbarity that it’s portrayed as in headlines. We should be much less concerned about the optics of a horse in landfill and much more concerned about how we arrived at an environment that allowed it to happen – an environment where an understandably upset trainer can at the same time be oblivious to his role in a system of animal abuse.

A horse does not care how his body is treated after his death, but he did care how he lived and died.

Some articles have attempted to bring nuance to the table, but most seem much more concerned about the effects of the body in the bin rather than the bigger picture. Cathrynne Henshall writes for the ABC: “The distress belongs to the people who cared for him, and the real risk is to the animals that might eat from the carcass.” She then concludes: “If this case makes us care more about horses, that attention belongs with the living: how they are housed, trained, raced and retired, and whether their deaths are timely and humane.”

These aren’t questions with unknown answers that are just up for the reader’s interpretation. There are plenty of watchdogs and whistleblowers within the racing industry that collect information about the mistreatment of horses. But let’s focus on the main issue. Horse racing in Australia between 2024-2025 involved 35,625 horses and in that time 175 of them were killed – an average of one horse every two days. That’s a death rate of 1 in 200. For comparison, boxing is one of the deadliest sports for humans averaging 13 deaths per year or a death rate of 1 in 7,600. Do we truly think that horses deserve, through no choice of their own, to be subjected to almost 40 times more danger than we’re willing to subject ourselves to?

These horses are not dying of old age. Most racehorses are just four or five years old when they are killed and they are dying of exhaustion, heart attacks, and most commonly limb injuries. Limb injuries that are often not life-threatening, but profit-threatening. Racehorses who can no longer race are worthless in an industry that values a life by how much money it can make you.

It’s easy to be momentarily appalled by the very public disregard of life that we see in this news story. It is much harder to challenge our acceptance of the industry and culture that causes it.

If we think that So You Are deserved a better death, we should also think he, and all horses like him, deserved a better life. A life free of racing.

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Australian batsman kneels to sweep during a cricket Test match as the wicketkeeper crouches behind the stumps

What whispers about the ‘Sandpapergate’ alleged cover-up might reveal about cricket’s culture

Cricket batsman in helmet and pads drives the ball on the leg side as wicketkeeper and slip fielder watch closely

It is an iron law of history that the ‘cover-up’ of wrongdoing has consequences that are at least as dire as the original offence.

This is a lesson soon to be reinforced by what is likely to unfold in the wake of claims by retired test cricketer, Usman Khawaja, that the ball tampering incident in Cape Town (‘sandpapergate’) in 2018, was not an isolated incident perpetrated by just three players: Steve Smith, David Warner and Cameron Bancroft.

Instead, it is Khawaja’s evidence, now corroborated by David Warner, that sandpaper had been employed in an earlier test played in Port Elizabeth/Gqeberha. Furthermore, he claims that this was known by the whole of the Australian team.

As things stand, we are confronted by two groups of cricketers offering radically different accounts of what occurred. Neither side comes to the table with ‘clean hands’. In the case of Khawaja, we need to reckon with the fact that, on his own admission, he has been complicit in allowing a lie, about what occurred, to remain unchallenged. He has chosen to tell what he claims to be the truth of the matter only after retiring from test cricket.

One presumes that if Khawaja was still a member of the Australian team, then he would remain silent. On the other side, are past and current players who staunchly deny the truth of what Khawaja and Warner allege. They have a vested interest in asserting the truth of what they claim as to do otherwise would have a devastating impact on their personal reputations and the standing of the team.

Australians have been justifiably proud of the achievements of our elite cricketers in the time since the scandal first erupted. Part of our pride lay in the fact that they appeared to demonstrate that one could succeed, at the highest levels, while being ethical. The good that has been done under the leadership of Pat Cummins should be celebrated in its own terms. But how devastating would it be to discover that at the heart of this story lurks a deception.

I had the privilege of leading a team from The Ethics Centre that reviewed and reported on the underlying cultural factors that led to the events that unfolded, before the world’s eyes, at that infamous match at Cape Town. Our Terms of Reference explicitly excluded any investigation of the specific events that led to our enquiry.

Those matters had been investigated by Cricket Australia and the findings were concluded. Even so, we picked up whispers – very few and very faint – that, perhaps, the public record did not tell the full story. Given that we were precluded from straying from our task, the best we could do was circle back to some of those whom we had interviewed to offer them the opportunity to amend their statements about what had occurred.

I am bound by ongoing duties of confidentiality not to name the people with whom I subsequently spoke. All I can say is that if what Usman Khawaja alleges turns out to be true, then I was also lied to. In the face of explicit denials that there was anything more to be said on the matter, we were left with ‘whispers’ … and nothing more.

It is easy enough to understand how a group of players might have decided to perpetuate – either by act or omission – what could turn out to be a lie. Some people may have had only a vague understanding of what was actually afoot (just enough ‘constructive ignorance’ to make plausible deniability a possibility).

Others might have thought that it was for the ‘greater good’ that the price to be paid be limited to three players – a kind of triage in which one amputates a damaged limb in order to save the body as a whole. We may never really know the full range of motivations that led the team to act as they did in the aftermath of Cape Town.

What we do know is that many of those players remain in the Australian men’s cricket team. And one has to assume that the thinking that led to a possible (as yet unproven) ‘cover-up’ remains in place. That is a most troubling thought. Now, as a consequence of what has been alleged, by Usman Khwaja and David Warner, a spotlight is once again being shone into the darker recesses of the culture of elite, men’s cricket.

My fear is that if the lately revealed claims are be proven to be true, then the damage to the game will be at least as great as that caused by the original sin of ball tampering.

In all of this, we should not forget the role played by Cricket Australia. As far as I know, key recommendations made in our report have been set aside without much fanfare. The Australian Cricket Council was meant to bring together key stakeholders to work through complex issues. It appears to be dormant (if not dead).

I was appointed as the inaugural Ethics Commissioner for Australian Cricket. Just one issue was referred to me during my tenure. The period of appointment lapsed a couple of years ago. I do not know if anyone currently fulfils that role.

Most institutions have short memories and find it convenient to ‘turn the page’ or ‘look to the future’ once leadership changes. With a new Chair and CEO at Cricket Australia, I doubt that anyone has looked at our report for contemporary guidance. It is so ‘yesterday’ … but is it?

 

An edited version of this article originally appeared in Australian Financial Review.


Inmates in yellow uniforms lie on the floor of a prison common room, watched by guards in the Netflix Stanford Prison Experiment scene.

Netflix’s Stanford Prison Experiment deeply unsettled me – but not in the way I expected

Overhead view of Netflix's Stanford Prison Experiment set, showing inmates in yellow uniforms sprawled across a white common room floor.

It’s only a fool who pretends that they could have predicted that Philip Zimbardo’s infamous psychological study, the Stanford Prison Experiment, would one day end up as a reality TV show.  

Then again, in a media landscape where the only way to cut through is to spark think pieces (exactly like this one), perhaps we all should have. 

Enter Netflix’s The Stanford Prison Experiment, a six episode show that recreates Zimbardo’s experiment, albeit with a few notable tweaks: throwing an assemblage of strangers into a prison, randomly assigning them the roles of either guard or prisoner, and sitting back and waiting for the fireworks.  

The original experiment

There’s reason to expect fireworks, too, given how they famously ended the original experiment. Conducted in August 1971, the original Stanford Prison Experiment was an attempt by Zimbardo to discover “the psychological effects … of becoming a prisoner or prison guard.” He recruited 24 participants and randomly assigned nine of them to be prison guards, and nine to be prisoners (the remaining six were left as standbys). Setting them up in a makeshift prison, he allowed them largely to behave as they wanted. So he said, anyway. 

Six days later, Zimbardo ended up calling the whole thing off. He was, he told his fellow psychologists, horrified by the remarkably swift descent into barbarity: guards were wantonly abusing the prisoners, including making them wear bags on their heads and humiliating them. 

Such findings were in line with what a different study, the Milgram Experiment, had proved only a decade earlier. In that previous study, average citizens required only the slightest bit of pressure to begin “torturing” strangers, subjecting them to electric shocks when they got quiz answers wrong (the strangers were actually acting, and no electric shocks were given). Both the Milgram Experiment and the Stanford Prison Experiment were therefore designed to prove what mass atrocities like the Holocaust had already apparently taught the world – namely, that we are all only ever one slight and sometimes random poke away from becoming monsters only too happy to torture fellow humans. 

Only, it’s not quite clear that Zimbardo’s findings are as conclusive as he initially presented them. As one of the most famous psychology studies ever conducted, The Stanford Prison Experiment has been endlessly picked at, the cleanness of its data questioned: for a start, it’s not entirely true that Zimbardo and his team merely left the prisoners and guards to their own devices.  

Some have argued that the guards’ barbarism was subtly encouraged by the researchers; others have noted that the researchers’ initial habit of not stepping in to correct the guards’ behaviour meant it only escalated. Both critiques of the experiment essentially make the same point: that Zimbardo’s fake prison is not the real world, and that its results are therefore not transferable.  

The experiment for a new age

To its credit and my considerable surprise, the Netflix version goes some way to avoiding such critiques. When I loaded the show up, I expected the messiest possible version of Zimbardo’s work – maybe Mr Beast might swing in for the finale, I thought, in order to offer a guard a million dollars if they brutalised a prisoner.   

But actually, the Netflix show initially strikes one as more comprehensive than Zimbardo’s original work. For a start, participants have been recruited across gender and racial lines – in Zimbardo’s version, they were all men, and almost exclusively white. There are also more stages to the Netflix version, with one stage abruptly swapping the roles of prisoner and guard, to see how those who have been mistreated might react when given the opportunity to mistreat. And then there’s the inclusion of a safeword, allowing participants to halt the experiment themselves, not to mention a team – rather than just Zimbardo and his colleagues – sitting on the sidelines to dissect what we’re seeing. 

Initially, these additional layers impressed me. The cynical part of my brain noted that all these measures make for better TV, and were probably designed to that end, rather than to produce cleaner data – it’s hard to imagine that Netflix were motivated to greenlight a show by the desire to best a psychologist in the matter of academic rigour.  

But even though I grumbled, I found myself swept along by the content, particularly when it came to the ending, which (spoiler alert) sees the prisoners form a collective mass who elect to end the experiment as one. What a balm, I thought to myself. Rather than the violent pessimism of Zimbardo’s original experiment, what the show ended up proving was the solidarity of the oppressed – not disharmony, but the power we have to unite ourselves.  

Barbarism as spectacle, but make it ironic

Then I thought about it some more. And some more after that. Along the way, I found myself thinking, not for the first time recently, of the defining quality of our age – self-awareness. We’re in the era of post-post irony. Our onscreen heroes not only know they’re characters in a movie: we know that they know. Our thinking these days is inherently third-personal; we’re always considering how things might seem, and how we might interpret how they seem, and then how that interpretation itself might get interpreted by others.  

In essence, we know that the base impulse to watch a restaging of an experiment where people are awful to one another is a base impulse. And the executives at Netflix definitely know a version of the Zimbardo experiment that ends positively makes more headlines than a version that ends exactly how the original one does.  

What this show does, therefore, is seek to absolve you for watching depraved content by assuring you that it understands the idea of a Stanford Prison Experiment show is depraved content. It has its cake and eats it too: you get to watch all the titillating promise of people mistreating one another, and then you get the moral absolution of an ending in which the participants (almost literally) walk into the sunset. You the viewer are thus not only better than the guards – you’re better even than Zimbardo, who put them there in the first place. This time, the show says, we got it right. 

But perhaps that’s around the moment where your brain reminds you that we don’t get it right out in the real world, which is not akin to either Zimbardo’s experiment, or Netflix content. Whether or not the prison system is unjust in psychological simulations might be unclear; it’s certainly clear that it’s unjust in Australia, where minorities are routinely unfairly imprisoned and killed.  

There’s a lot of good reasons to be suspicious of Zimbardo’s original findings. There are even more reasons to be suspicious of the neat, calming resolution of a Netflix adaptation of those findings.

Zimbardo freaked us out by suggesting that barbarism lies always in our hearts, waiting for its moment. Netflix says: nobody really means each other harm.

In an era of unspeakable violence, both implicit and explicit, that latter conclusion – particularly when packaged and delivered by a company with a net worth of $279.1 billion USD – might be the most dangerous of them all. 

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Person in white t-shirt, dark pants, and rubber boots standing outdoors on grass, holding a plastic bag while doing the wrong thing

You’re probably doing the wrong thing (and that’s okay)

Tattooed arms in gloves clutching a bag, white shirt and tall boots, person standing in a grassy field doing the wrong thing

10 years ago, I didn’t pick up litter I saw on the beach. At most, I might bury it or throw it farther up onto the sand away from the water and dust my hands of responsibility. 

Being good is both harder and, more importantly, easier than you think. You’ve probably heard the aphorism “Perfect is the enemy of the good” or something similar to it. In popular culture, there is a general idea that having lofty goals (“aiming for perfection”) is counterproductive because it dissuades people from making incremental positive change by casting aside anything but achieving The Ultimate Goal as “not good enough”.  

This is demonstrated clearly in conversations about politics. For example, if the Greens have a goal, it’s likely that Labor’s bill will get about 50% of the way there. Sometimes, the Greens will block the bill by abstaining (preventing the government from obtaining a majority vote to pass) and use their vote to bargain for further changes. This is about the time when criticisms start being levelled, by citizens and politicians alike, that perfection is getting in the way of progress. Why impede something good getting done? 

The reason lots of people fall into this simplification is because we are very practiced at doing it to ourselves. That is, when we subconsciously recognise that the most ethical option in any given situation is also a bit more effort or complicated than we’d like, this cognitive dissonance often results in a sort of “moral settling” where we convince ourselves that the next best option is good enough. This is, importantly, despite being capable of doing the best option. 

I think, therefore I try

What does it mean to be capable of doing something? I mentioned that being good is both harder and easier than you think. It’s easier in the sense that most of our everyday moral choices are not difficult in practicality. For most people, it’s not physically demanding or complex to pick up litter, wear a mask, go to an op-shop, not yell at people, buy less meat, or even research the effects of your everyday choices.  

However, it can be very psychologically demanding – at least in the short term. Reshaping mental and physical habits is difficult, especially when we are bombarded with messaging that makes incremental change feel like irredeemable failure.  

Over time, I’ve slowly decided that something is better than nothing – that making small improvements is better than giving in to the hopelessness you might feel when you consider the gap between your current behaviour and what you think is most ethical.

Many years later, I’m now in the habit of leaving the beach with two fistfuls of rubbish. 

The habit has also extended to other places, so I’ll often find myself picking up rubbish on the way to the station or on my lunch break in the park. I still give myself excuses – maybe there’s too much, or maybe it’s too far away from a bin – but to me the important thing is that I am slowly but surely changing my habits in a positive way. 

Shoot for the moon and even if you miss, you’ll land among the stars

As far as aphorisms go, I like this one better. Especially in the personal realm, we should be aiming to be the best versions of ourselves and recognising that failure to meet high moral standards is only a problem if we let it lead us into apathy. We shouldn’t be aiming to be perfect, but we should be aiming for perfect.  

Rather than thinking of perfection as some universally applicable state of being, we should instead think of our own personal conceptions of perfection as a compass.

What values and principles underlie the best version of yourself? If you can’t achieve them all in one go, how can you make changes in your behaviour and habits to encourage growth in that direction? 

Incidentally, this is one of my favourite things about consequentialism (the category of ethical frameworks that prioritise outcomes): it allows for personal circumstances and psychological inability. Sometimes the best action to take in an objective view might be something that’s too difficult for a person in that moment. But it also demands that we consciously develop the moral motivation to change our habits and psychology such that we can eventually overcome those inabilities and make our future decisions better.  

I’ll leave you with the words of Michael Schur from his book How to Be Perfect: 

“To demand perfection, or to hold people to impossible standards, is to deny the simple and beautiful reality that nobody is perfect … there will be plenty of times when you do not flourish.  

[But] if you’ve tried to do something good a thousand times and you’ve failed a thousand times, and the people around you are miserable, and you’re at the end of your rope, and you’re losing faith in yourselves, you know what we want you to do then?  

Keep trying, keep trying, keep trying.” 

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Two people standing in a gallery looking at the famous cubist painting Les Demoiselles d Avignon by the artist Pablo Picasso

How should we decide between the art and the artist?

Visitors observe the fragmented figures of Picasso masterpiece Les Demoiselles d Avignon while debating art and the artist

You are engrossed in reading a beloved novel when a staggering headline about its author appears on your phone. Or perhaps your favourite song comes on shuffle, only to remind you of the controversy surrounding the musician who created it. Gradually, an action that once felt effortless becomes somewhat dissonant.  

In an age where artists’ personal identities are increasingly publicised, this conflict between personal enjoyment and ethical discomfort affects nearly all of us as consumers of media. From J.K. Rowling’s controversial views on transgender issues, Kanye West’s antisemitic remarks, to confirmed charges against R. Kelly, discussions arise about whether it is desirable to separate our support for the art from its creator.  

These debates often fall into a false binary; we either divorce the art from the artist entirely or outright reject both.  

The first option risks overlooking the ways our consumption continues to multidimensionally benefit an artist through financial support and cultural visibility. Yet, the second may neglect the independent significance that art can acquire in the lives of its audience. As French literary critic Roland Barthes proposed in The Death of the Author, the meaning of a work is partly determined by personal engagement and not solely by its creator. Books, songs and films often become attached to one’s intimate memories, making total rejection a loss of something emotionally significant.  

The difficulty lies in that neither complete separation nor rejection leaves enough room for nuance. Maybe instead we should focus on what ethical responsibilities we have as consumers when engaging with the works of controversial artists.

Rather than seeking a single answer, we need a framework that helps us distinguish between and evaluate different forms of support. Such a framework can be found in consequentialist and deontological ethics.  

Why consequences matter

Consequentialism is the ethical perspective that actions should be judged primarily by their outcomes. Applied to the art and artist dilemma, this viewpoint redirects the attention away from abstract questions and towards the practical effects of our consumption. What impact does one’s engagement have on the artist’s wealth, influence and public platform? 

Financial support is the most visible dimension as money flows directly from people’s purchases to the creator or their associated industries. Yet, symbolic support is just as significant. Attention and traction itself are a form of currency in algorithmic contemporary media. Repeated streaming of a song or the sharing of a post increases its cultural relevance and signals to platforms that the subject generates interest.  

Consider the case of J.K. Rowling.  

The Harry Potter franchise creates significant ongoing commercial and cultural value through many products and experiences. At the same time, Rowling’s public comments on transgender issues and financial backing of these views have sparked widespread criticism. This led many readers to question whether further engagement with the franchise will allow her rhetoric to reach a larger audience. When those views contribute to a climate of exclusion and hostility towards transgender people and actual changes in law, supporting Rowling’s influence as a consumer may carry societal consequences beyond individual acts of consumption.  

A comparable dynamic can be illustrated in the music industry. Following Kanye West’s reported antisemitic remarks on social media, on the news and in his music in 2022, major companies including Adidas severed ties with him and quoted his comments as “unacceptable, hateful and dangerous”. However, institutional responses alone do not undermine an artist’s influence long-term. In April 2026, two sold-out Kanye performances in Los Angeles reportedly grossed more than USD$33 million. Here, individual consumption driving demand for his concert becomes ethically impactful, since it generates large-scale cultural relevance, further financial gain and trivialises the harmful impact of his influence. 

Choosing with awareness

This outcome-driven viewpoint illuminates an important distinction – not all forms of engagement carry the same consequences. We can consider our choices along a spectrum of ethical responsibility.  

At one end of the spectrum are forms of engagement that provide little or no new support to the creator. On a personal scale, revisiting Harry Potter as a childhood favourite already sitting on your bookshelf allows appreciation of the work without contributing to Rowling’s current brand. At the other end are forms of consumption that reinforce an artist’s influence more directly. Attending expensive paid events or heavily promoting Kanye content online help sustain the foundational systems that keep the artist influential.  

The more active the support, the stronger ethical justification it requires.

Limits of artistic appreciation

Nevertheless, if one’s engagement gives the artist no meaningful profit or influence – for example, if they are decreased and their estate does not continue their wrongdoing – does it automatically make consumption ethically permissible? Irrespective of consequences, deontological ethics judge the right or wrong of an action based on principles, rights and duties.  

Famous American singer R. Kelly was convicted of offences involving sexual exploitation and forced labour in 2021. Prosecutors proved that he used his fame to recruit and exploit victims. The documentary Surviving R. Kelly allows female victims to recount their experiences. Their testimonies provide evidence of the wrongs committed against these women, which gives audiences reason to consider a change in behaviour, such as boycotting his music, regardless of the artistic appreciation or personal enjoyment his art may provide.  

From a deontological perspective, audiences have a duty to support victims and to withdraw support from perpetrators, rather than allowing artistic talent to excuse conduct that violates fundamental rights.   

As active participants in contemporary culture, the relationship between art and the artist will always remain complicated. By recognising that every stream contributes to a dynamic of attention and social power, we must realise that our daily choices are not trivial. Ethical consumption begins when we start consciously asking what our engagement with a work means for the world around us and what it reflects about ourselves. 

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A teacher stands before a group of young children sitting at a table during an ethics education lesson in a bright classroom

Research shows ethics education teaches kids right from wrong. Why can so few students access it?

Students sitting around a large dark table listening to an ethics education instructor lead a discussion in a bright room

How important is it that kids learn to tell right from wrong?

Businessman and former university chancellor David Gonski recently called for ethics classes to be rolled out in all Australian schools to boost social cohesion.

At the moment, ethics does not get dedicated time in the school curriculum.

Some might argue children don’t need school ethics classes if they already learn ethics from their parents and other adults in their lives.

But our research shows formal ethics education can make a difference. In the largest ever review on the subject, we found teaching ethics can improve students’ ability to reason through ethical issues and prioritise doing the right thing.

Ethics education in Australia

Ethics has been part of the national Australian Curriculum for more than a decade. It sits alongside literacy, numeracy and four other subjects as a “general capability”. This means it’s a cross-curriculum skill every Australian child is supposed to learn in all subjects.

So in theory, ethics education is the responsibility of all teachers, even when teaching mathematics, art or biology.

In practice, no-one is responsible for teaching these skills. Australian research has found even teachers who value general capabilities, such as ethics, struggle to teach them explicitly. This is because the focus is on what gets tested. In turn, this means “the intentions of the Australian Curriculum […] are not being realised”.

In most Australian states, the only structured ethics offering in schools is during religious instruction. But these are only optional lessons, and families who want a secular alternative are often left without it.

Our study

We synthesised 92 randomised controlled trials – the most rigorous form of evidence in education. Together, the studies involved 12,693 students from primary school through to university.

The studies covered 20 countries, including Australia, and spanned nearly five decades.

Of those 92 randomised trials, 54 compared students receiving ethics lessons to those in control groups who did not learn ethics. The other studies compared different types of ethics instruction against each other.

The studies with control groups tell us how well students currently learn ethics without dedicated classes (such as from their parents or through other generalised learning at school).

What we found

Students who received formal ethics education were better able to recognise ethical issues (also called “moral sensitivity”), gave better reasons about the right thing to do (“moral judgement”) and wanted to prioritise doing the right thing (“moral motivation”).

Four in five trials showed meaningful positive effects in these areas.

Our study did not measure kids’ actual behaviour over the long run. But we know higher moral reasoning capacity is associated with being more likely to help others and resist peer pressure. It is also associated with lower levels of juvenile delinquency.

We also found how you teach ethics matters.

Programs built around student discussion worked well. Programs built around lectures and readings alone did not, like in most subjects. You learn better when you can explain your thinking, safely make mistakes, and get feedback.

This is why ethics is so good to learn in schools: you can have discussions with peers and educators in a way that’s hard for most parents to reproduce at home.

Some Australian states do this well…

New South Wales already has a model for teaching ethics.

The free Primary Ethics program runs in about 500 NSW schools and reaches roughly 40,000 students each week using trained volunteers. Its curriculum is built around small groups, working through questions such as “Is it ever okay to break a promise?”

This is the kind of structured discussion our research identified as most effective for teaching ethics.

Primary Ethics runs during the same time slot as religious instruction lessons. It was introduced because growing numbers of students were opting out of religious classes, but had nothing meaningful to do instead. The classes are free because they’re delivered by trained volunteers.

… but most don’t

Dedicated ethics classes are patchy in other states. For example, Queensland and Western Australia have class time for religious instruction but there is no secular alternative. Students just get “other instruction” during this time.

Other states would need to amend their laws to allow (not require) secular ethics as a formal alternative to religious instruction, exactly as NSW did in 2010.

No new funding or teachers would be needed. If they run at the same time as religious instruction, there is already space in the school week for these classes.

New volunteers would be needed to run the discussions, but NSW has shown there’s a willing contingent of people who can deliver the program when the lesson plans are already prepared for them.

A more ambitious approach

A more ambitious change would be to treat ethics as a core subject in its own right, as in France and Finland.

This could mean having ethics education on the timetable, right alongside maths and languages. Every student would be taught by a trained specialist teacher, instead of asking trained volunteers or other teachers to cover it.

Our review showed ethics education helps at every level of schooling.

Which model works best is still an open question; whether to make room for one arguably is not.

We make time for maths, sport and music because we think they matter for a good life. If knowing right from wrong matters at least as much, it has earned at least a little time on the timetable.

 

This article was originally published in The Conversation.

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A woman in a red blazer speaks at the Festival of Dangerous Ideas 2026, gesturing while a man sits listening beside her.

5 things we learnt from Festival of Dangerous Ideas 2026

Three panelists engage in a deep discussion at the Festival of Dangerous Ideas 2026, set against a vibrant red backdrop.

Across 10 days, 13 iconic venues and 115 sessions this year’s Festival of Dangerous Ideas explored hatred, belonging, nationhood, conspiracy, faith and equality.

Here are 5 things we learnt from the Festival in 2026:

You cannot have agency if you live in an environment where you are insidiously manipulated

Filipino journalist and 2021 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Ressa argues the rise of Donald Trump and populist authoritarians worldwide is no anomaly. It’s the product of an information ecosystem built to amplify the worst of our nature, and divide and manipulate us. Data shows Trump, Jair Bolsonaro and Rodrigo Duterte likely wouldn’t have been elected without algorithms boosting their visibility and credibility. Platforms built to keep us scrolling let lies outrun facts, and AI is compounding the problem, crowding out trusted human sources altogether. Without a check on power, authoritarianism walks through unchallenged – and Ressa warns the same could happen here, in Australia.

We must get off the big tech platforms and move to “public interest tech”, such as her own Rappler news website and other sites run by the people, not by tech billionaires. Rebuilding trust means choosing real conversations with real humans over algorithms designed to keep us apart.

The greatest wisdom is crossing the distance to listen

In a packed room, Jewish-American journalist Peter Beinart opened his session Facing Moral Wreckage with an unexpected expression of gratitude – not for those who agreed with him, but for those who didn’t. “Equality is the antithesis of bigotry,” he says, and he extends that principle even to those he disagrees with most. In a world where we increasingly curate our information feeds and conversations to confirm what we already believe, Beinart argues the most radical thing we can do is choose to listen to someone we disagree with. “The people who go the furthest distance to listen to different points of view show the greatest wisdom.”

We didn’t lose our privacy, it was taken at scale

Digital rights activist Cory Doctorow unpacks the forces driving the “enshittification” of the platforms we’ve come to rely on – and how far the rot now reaches.

Take “algorithmic wage discrimination”, where American hospitals, keen to avoid unionised staff, increasingly contract nurses through apps that act as an “Uber for nursing.” Before a nurse accepts a shift, the app checks a data broker for their credit card debt. And the more they owe, the lower the wage they’re offered. These apps exist to strip away workplace protections and squeeze workers down to the lowest wage they’ll accept, Doctorow says – and the privacy invasion that makes it possible is entirely legal. Labour protections are weak, but privacy protections are weaker.

This isn’t an accident, Doctorow argues, but the result of a concentrated, wildly profitable surveillance industry that has monetised the abuse of human rights at scale – drawing a direct line from Silicon Valley to nurses whose wages shrink because they can’t make a credit card payment.

“Tech companies aren’t spying on you because privacy is dead. Google spies on you for the same reason a dog licks its balls: because it can, and no one makes them stop.”

The banality of equality is what makes it dangerous

Equality requires us to fully recognise how much we have in common with even those very different or very far from us. Professor of history and author Ussama Makdisi says that this very simple concept is so self-evident that it is often completely overlooked.

The Middle East, as it is known in the Western world today, is too often seen through the lens of turmoil, religious fundamentalism, war, endless conflicts – but, Makdisi urges us to realise, this is both a harmfully reductive characterisation of the region today and a historically inaccurate characterisation of the region’s history.

By drawing on the intrinsic humanity of the people in these regions, Makdisi shows they had both a richer and more peaceful co-existence prior to colonisation. If we are to ever to reach relative peace again, we must be truthful about this past and recognise the way that populations are dehumanised through ahistoric cultural representations.

Not all dangerous ideas are easy to see

Many people expect danger to come from the furthest fringes of politics or culture, or to immediately outrage us. But we live in a rapidly changing world, filled with overlapping crises, competing truths and profound uncertainty – one where the forces shaping our lives are increasingly interconnected and difficult to see.

This year’s program expanded beyond talks and panels, and into arts, films, excursions and banned books – showing how real danger lies in confronting the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to be. It means resisting simplistic narratives and probing beneath the surface. It means recognising that we may inhabit the same world while experiencing it in radically different ways.

As Festival Director Danielle Harvey says: “The most dangerous ideas are not the ones that offend us – it’s the ones we are wilfully ignoring.”

 

Catch up on select 2026 sessions, on demand now.

Photo by Ken Leanfore

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Richard Flanagan, author of Heresies, features in a thoughtful studio portrait with a shaved head and a grey trimmed beard

Richard Flanagan: Heresies

Writer Richard Flanagan gazes off-camera wearing a dark jacket in this dimly lit portrait for his book titled Heresies

This is a published extract from Heresies: Occasional Pieces by Richard Flanagan, available 4 August 2026 from Penguin Books.

Many years ago I was a guest at a Slovenian writers festival that culminated in readings in a karst limestone cave. In a remarkable natural amphitheatre there had assembled a large crowd. Many came from local villages and had brought their children along. Several writers read; the last Slovenia’s most revered poet. A short man with a white beard, he somehow filled the vast space and commanded attention.

Bard-like, he recited in Slovene from memory, his voice sonorous, his rhythm musical, more incantation than reading. It was an extraordinary performance. It became apparent that the large crowd was there to hear him and really only him, their Homer. I understood not a word he said but with that crowd felt everything.

The corollary of this experience is Robert Frost’s icy observation that hell is a half-filled auditorium. I was honoured in 2021 to be asked to give the US PEN Arthur Miller Freedom to Write Lecture in New York; less thrilled when as COVID continued to hold us all in varying states of confinement it became clear that I would not be able to give the lecture in person but would have to do it online, beamed from my Tasmanian home to the US. Speaking to a screen on a wintry night is several miles beyond hell. For there is in the strange comity of speaker and a live crowd something that goes to the heart of writing, which, after all, begins in song and chorus. Words have meaning with an audience, while without them all speech is no more than cold draughts, brief breaths here and then gone. And that night I had only the eerie pixelated silence of my laptop, and thinking of how even Homer telling of brave Odysseus’s return to Ithaca might have faltered at such a pass, I was condemned once more to talk into what felt the growing void.

 – 

It is strange to have as my subject ‘freedom to write’, coming from an island which, for a quarter of its modern history, was a slave society. Though there were major differences, the literature of the era abounds with comparisons between the convict society of Van Diemen’s Land and the slave societies of the Americas.

My forebears were transported as convicts from Ireland, frequently in the same ships and similar conditions to those which transported Africans into American slavery, now plying the same trade with a different-coloured cargo and a new destination, where many of the same practices and even administrators of Caribbean slave colonies were deployed.

My island’s founding stigmata has a second wound: the near successful genocide of the Tasmanian Aboriginal population. To this day most Tasmanians are the descendants of the survivors of this twin trauma.

With Conradian exactitude, the war was called at the time a war of extermination. And this exter-mination, as many noted then and later, extended to others—the Tasmanian emu, the Tasmanian tiger—as if it were necessary that some universe of wonder had to be obliterated to cloak the crime. And with it memory was to be extirpated, enforced by silence. Things became unsayable, so many things.

It may be as a species we are defined by our ability to forget, yet freedom exists only in the space of memory.

I was born less than a mile from the plantation my great-great grandfather was sent to work on as a convict labourer. Freedom to write was at the first step a freedom to think, to conceive of oneself as a free being, a thought over a century in forming. The freedom to write is the freedom to say the unsayable; and to say it I had to squeeze the convict blood out of myself drop by drop, word by sentence by book.

In imagining how to do that it was often to African-American writers like Ralph Ellison, James Baldwin and Toni Morrison I turned. I discovered my island in their world, I discovered I belonged both to my small island and to the universe of literature, and I learnt that I could not deny either without denying myself.

To write I had to be free and to be free I had to write. That, for a writer, is the task, the only task.

To be free.

A writer’s freedom is challenged by many things. In my country of Australia the state has ever more repressive laws that significantly encroach on freedom of speech, while as our society grows more unequal the richest and most powerful have the money to leverage grotesque libel laws to silence.

In my country today the practice of journalism is chilled by such acts as our attorney-general suing a reporter and our public broadcaster, when they alleged the anal rape of a minor by a senior unnamed politi-cian. The attorney-general self-identified as the alleged rapist and on that basis instigated his legal action, which experts say has a good chance of success.

But I want to talk today about another aspect of a writer’s freedom.

We are confronted with the title of this lecture by a question masquerading as an unremarkable truth. The freedom to write—but to write what? Because what is at stake—what is always at stake—is finally not being free to write but being free to write the unsayable, the thing not allowed to be said, to tear aside the shrouds of power and wealth and their accompanying conventions and orthodoxies to describe what is.

Because in most places at most times, writers are free to write. We should not forget that tyrannies frequently reserve a higher, more privileged place for writers than democracies, a velvet prison that writers, for the most part, are happy to inhabit.

They are free to write anything they like, as long as what they like to write is what power wants written, and it contents itself with saying the sayable.

And therein lies the rub.

Of the many pernicious fictions writers retail to themselves and, given the chance, to others, perhaps the most ludicrous is that writers wish to write the truth.

Of course nothing is further from the truth than this lie.

Encrusting the lie are comforting nonsenses. One of which writers are fond is that the truth carries all before it. But truth mostly serves only to carry the truth-teller to the abyss personally—and quickly.

Much as they may pretend otherwise, writers, as a rule, are not such fools as to not know this.

The fatal problem of Camus’ Meursault in The Outsider isn’t that he killed another man but that having killed another man he can’t lie about his reasons why—and so he is executed. For telling the truth. This is both moving and comic and therefore deeply moving. It is also profoundly unrealistic.

We all lie about our reasons in order that we might live, and, when the going gets rough, writers and artists generally roll over more quickly than most. William Hazlitt once observed that for every tyrant born so too are a thousand men willing to be enslaved. We might add that of that thousand, a disproportionate number will always be the artists and writers.

And how can it be otherwise? Each of our lives is a war between, on the one hand our need to conform so that we might have shelter, food and security, and on the other the desire of our soul to be free. We understand both are necessary to us but frequently also irreconcilable. Our lives are a walk through the rubble that results, our character the map of our journey.

Another illusion writers have is that they are the voice of their people. This idea has a long history, given glorious tongue by Shelley with his injunction that poets were the unacknowledged legislators of the world. A hundred years later, as nationalism became the new social organising principle, beckoning in a century of horror, Shelley’s post-French Revolution global hopes had somewhat narrowed to Joyce’s declaration that he would ‘forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race’.

Such monomania hides hubris: the unacknowledged legislator ends up purchased by power’s lobbyist while what emerges from the smithy is too often ideology’s apologist.

And for that reason artists and writers are mostly not their people’s heroes or heroines. Mostly they rub along with whatever is the new order, free to write as long as they write in certain ways about certain things. If you’re seeking direction in a corrupted society, the hairdresser and plumber are more likely to serve as moral exemplars than the novelist and playwright.

Klaus Mann, who in 1936 published Mephisto, an instructive novel on this theme, observed a few years earlier as the Nazis’ rise to power became irresistible, how many intellectuals and artists were crossing over to the Nazi side, not because they were sympathetic to the movement, but because that’s where the energy and the future were.

In an essay written in 1999, Roberto Bolaño describes how in Pinochet’s Chile, a young woman with literary ambitions, and her American husband, who worked for the Chilean secret police and perhaps the CIA, had a large house in which upstairs she held literary soirees and downstairs he tortured political prisoners. Bolaño wonders if the writers ‘remember the annoyance of the flickering current that made lamps blink and music stop, interrupting the dancing. Just as surely, they knew nothing about the parallel dance, in which the jab of the prod tensed the tortured back of a knee in a voltaic arc.’

And this, concludes, Bolaño, is how the literature of every country is built.

The word literature—which with Bolaño always carried an ambiguous, even pejorative sense—here means writing that supports the parallel dance of horror, the literature that doesn’t question, the literature of accepted orthodoxies.

In America you have your parallel dancers, as we do in Australia—the Aboriginal people who die in overwhelming numbers in custody, the refugees who we incarcerated in theatres of cruelty on remote Pacific islands. But acknowledging the parallel dancers does not mean immediately writing only about them, for them, of them. To oppose the parallel dance is to oppose the orthodoxies of the age. It is the freedom to write not what we are told but what we experience, and in that realm of experience must be the imagination and its capacious inventions. There must be fancy, the experi-ence that is not authenticated in or by experience. There must be the tearing down of the border walls between I and you, me and us, a breach in the razor wire that separates one soul from the next.

PEN’s noble, necessary work over the best part of a century has been to battle the external constraints that stop a writer writing—and, worse, that imprison and kill writers for what they have written and may yet write.

But we live in a new age.

We need to recognise new forms and new ways of censorship. The inner freedom to write what you think and what you feel, what you know and what you experience, is always hard and is frequently the most difficult battle. But it grows harder.

We live once more in censoring times and what is confusing is that the new censors are not the state or state bodies. They are us.

In the wake of 1989, we wrongly believed that material progress and human freedom were twins, that the former necessarily led to the latter. But as China so stunningly shows, you can have ever more material progress and ever less freedom. And we were blind to the erosion of our own freedom that our material progress and technological triumphs brought in their wake.

For a few short decades we in the west thought we could now expect no censorship. But as we grew more unequal, as we found it within ourselves to see torture as acceptable, the persecution of refugees as necessary, that silence was a precondition of tolerance, we could not see that a corrosion of something fundamental was taking place.

What is acceptable now is not ordered but understood, conveyed by the nuance of new social proscriptions, enforced by a roll call of new profanities, new obscenities, new urgencies, new blasphemies, which we absorb as if by osmosis and call common sense, decency, respect, responsibility.

Writing, though, should never pretend to respect or responsibility. Ever since the man from La Mancha put a toilet bowl on his head and strode out into the world in emulation of higher things, great literature has not been serious about the pieties and verities of its age. It has confronted cant and dogma with the absurdity of existence and laughed, questioning and upending them. Posterity, the blindest of fools, condescends to all who have gone before. Yet Cervantes, like Voltaire, laughed at religious faith and mocked rigidly held beliefs.

Do we?

The new proscriptions arise out of important and necessary social struggles. But in prosecuting causes and politics, writers are sometimes told to stay in their lanes. Writers who offer nuanced positions are attacked as the enemy they are not. Those who fail to observe the new road rules suffer opprobrium, shaming, and sometimes are called on to publicly repent.

Of course, we have always wanted work that flatters our own stupidities. But this human weakness is vastly amplified and empowered by new technologies that are, in the final instance, unaccountable except to the profit and loss spreadsheets of the richest and most powerful corporations in human history.

Many writers are, of course, happy to conform, and in conforming condemn those who won’t conform. They ‘would’, as Seamus Heaney had it about one of his millennia-old bog people, connive/ in civilized outrage yet understand the exact and tribal, intimate revenge.

This too is deeply human.

And yet the exact and tribal, intimate revenge turbocharged by the algorithms of greed should not determine the fate of writers, nor should they be the metric by which writing is judged or created.

A deeper damage is to the idea of writing itself—its capacity and desire for necessary invention, for the necessity of story and fancy, of its ability to encompass worlds to which neither the writer nor reader belong, and yet to which they find themselves profoundly joined.

In this sense the freedom to write is finally not so much a battle with the external forces but with the internal. It becomes a question of what was once called character, or the soul. It would not be presumptuous to call it a spiritual battle.

And in that battle it constantly comes up against the dogmas of conformity.

It is no revelation that nationalism led to many of the great disasters of the twentieth century—and not just in literature. Before the Balkan wars, the Slovenian poet Tomaž Šalamun famously wrote, ‘I got tired of my tribe / and moved out.’ These days, though, writers once again search for a tribe to move in with, as they once did with religion, and then empires, and then nations, and now identity.

This change has deep and profound historical roots and consequences, perhaps the least—but for us the most—that of the great national novel giving way to the great identity novel. But if the tribes change, all tribes still finally demand tribal allegiances to belief and dogma that can leave a writer unfree to write what they believe.

Šalamun’s point of view was, of course, doubly heretical, speaking out against both nationalism and the ruling Titoist ideology of his day.

But it wasn’t without antecedent.

In post-revolutionary Russia, in 1921, the first book to be banned in a pique of tribal dogma was Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We, the ur-novel, from Orwell’s 1984 on, for all the dystopias that followed and now litter bookshops. Before he had started We Zamyatin observed, ‘He who has found his ideal today is, like Lot’s wife, already turned into a pillar of salt and does not move ahead. The world is kept alive only by heretics: the heretic Christ, the heretic Copernicus, the heretic Tolstoy. Our symbol of faith is heresy.’

The fate of heretics is not, however, an easy one, as Zamyatin recognised two years after We was banned: ‘Heretics,’ he wrote, ‘are justly exterminated by fire, by axes, by words . . . It is just to chop off the head of a heretical literature that challenges dogma; this literature is harmful. But harmful literature is more useful than useful literature.’

Soon all that would be possible in Russia was to dedicate oneself, as Isaac Babel, in one of his best black jokes, told the Soviet Congress of Writers in 1934, to the ‘literature of silence’.

And then head after head fell to Stalin’s bullets, the heretic Isaac Babel’s among them.

We all write in the nightmare of the dark. We cannot escape our tribal impulse, our desire to conform—for their sources lie as deep in our hearts as love and good-ness, perhaps even deeper. But a novel, when it succeeds, takes the writer beyond their own history and character, escapes the shackles of their politics and opinions, and in the alchemy of story makes of the writer’s soul that which joins one human being with all.

In the end, novels, the great subversive medium, subvert not only what society thinks is right but what the writer intends to write.

Heresy allows a writer to write freely, allows writing to be an act of joy that arises from the same deep place where laughter lives, countering the farce of dogma with the reality of life. And that joy, that laughter, that irreverence, that heretical impulse that begins with a toilet bowl astride a mad head is the only way to write when faced with even the most disturbing aspects of that reality, which today appear before us as the existential crisis of climate.

The writer’s challenge in the Anthropocene is finding a language that encompasses hope as well as grief. In meeting that challenge writing must be the rising note heard over the long silence of orthodoxy; the single, unsilenceable note that ascends.

Such language needs to encompass hope, not because of any earnest or worthy considerations, not as a morale booster in a dark time, but because as a species it is hope that propels us forward, as individuals it is hope that keeps us alive. As Primo Levi observed in Auschwitz, it was the inmates who lost hope who were not just despised but seen to have forsaken their humanity. Any literature about such darkness as the climate crisis has to admit to that most human trait of life, or it is untrue to this most fundamental truth of human beings.

Even that gloomiest of poets Philip Larkin wrote in his most enduring line, ‘What will survive of us is love’—a line he felt weak and rued writing. Perhaps for Larkin the line suggested a mawkishness or sentimen-tality. Perhaps he felt it heretical to his harder, ossified aesthetics. But the line nevertheless outlived him. If, ultimately, it is all that remains of his life’s works, what will survive of Larkin is a line that reads ‘What will survive of us is love.’

Perhaps for any of us to write of hope, to write of love, we must learn once more to be free, and to embrace heresy.

And for that to happen we must every day write ourselves out of the literature of silence.

We all come from something and, equally, need to be liberated from that same thing. That to me is the promise of literature. That I am not one. That I am not alone. That I am free.

 

Richard Flanagan presents Heresies at Festival of Dangerous Ideas on Saturday 22 August at Carriageworks, Sydney, examining how prohibitions on speaking freely put Australia at risk of becoming the country of the unsaid. Tickets on sale now.

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Weathered stone statue of an angel with large wings pointing upward while holding a floral wreath against a bright blue sky

Why moral certainty leads to ruin

Two aged marble angel grave markers stand against a clear sky representing moral certainty and the heavy burden of ruin

It’s natural to seek confidence in our moral beliefs. But it’s only a short step from absolute moral certainty to intolerance and extremism.

Two and a half thousand years ago, travellers to the great temple of Apollo, home to the famous Delphic oracle, would have passed by three inscriptions engraved above its entrance. The first is one that Socrates adopted as his personal motto: “know thyself”. The second shared some oft neglected common sense: “all things in moderation”. But it’s the third that I think is most important today: “certainty leads to ruin”. 

This motto is doubly important when we think about moral certainty. While it’s natural for us to seek confidence in our moral beliefs, a surplus of certainty can drive us into toxic territory. Consider who is more dangerous: the person who has no moral compunctions at all; or the individual who has absolute moral certainty. 

The former – we might call them an ‘amoralist’ – wouldn’t care about ideas of right and wrong. They’d have no interest in the welfare of others. They might lack empathy and come across as callous or cruel. We can imagine them behaving purely in their own self-interest, even screwing other people over to benefit themselves. But it’s hard to imagine them going out of their way to punish someone if it’s not going to benefit them. 

On the other hand, the individual with absolute moral certainty – call them a ‘moral crusader’ – would be driven by their idea of right and wrong. Their moral fervour could bring them to see wrongdoers as being unrecoverably corrupted. They wouldn’t only seek to punish people who have crossed them, but anyone whom they deem to have violated their moral standards. We can imagine the moral crusader incurring a great cost to see their moral worldview realised. In the extreme, they even might be motivated kill innocent people – or themselves – to sate their moral outrage.  

The most violent extremists, terrorists, leaders of genocidal campaigns and perpetrators of acts like honour killings typically don’t lack moral fibre. In fact, it’s the opposite: they have too much. It’s precisely their sense of absolute moral certainty that makes them capable of such atrocities. 

This is something Hollywood struggles with. Many fictional villains are depicted as being narcissistic or psychopathic amoralists. But history’s (and fiction’s) greatest villains – from Hitler to Thanos – are moral crusaders, convinced of their own moral vision, and that those who oppose them are the true evildoers. 

But it’s not just extremists who are susceptible to becoming moral crusaders. The seeds of moral certainty lie within us all. And if we’re not careful, it can lead us to ruin.  

Moral colours

Say you see a youth in a hoodie knock over an old woman in a wheelchair and grab her purse. It’s likely that you’d immediately feel a strong sense of outrage. It didn’t arise because you cooly evaluated the situation, reasoned that stealing from a vulnerable person was wrong, then got outraged. In fact, the thought process is almost entirely the other way around. 

First, you see it through the lens of your moral worldview: the old woman in the wheelchair is vulnerable, the hooded youth is vicious, his act driven by greed. Those observations immediately spark outrage. It’s only then that your rational faculties kick in to render what happened in abstract terms using the language of morality, like saying “stealing from a vulnerable person is wrong”. 

Perception is doing a lot of heavy lifting here. They way you see the scene is already coloured by your moral lens. You’ve already projected your values onto what’s happening well before you’ve had a chance to think about it more deeply.  

But, in projecting our values onto the world, we’ve taken something that comes from inside of us and see as being a part of the world. It’s like when we slip from saying “I dislike broccoli” to saying “broccoli is bad”. The first is a subjective statement about our tastes; the second is an objective statement about the world. 

When we see something as being objective, we tend to think that everyone must see it in the same way. That makes it harder for us to imagine what the world looks like to someone else, such as someone who has a different set of interests or moral worldview.

One person may see a colonial era statue as representing achievement and pride; another sees it as representing injustice and shame. It also make us more likely to think that people who see things differently must be broken somehow, or that they’re morally corrupt. It’s only a short step from there to dehumanising them and robbing them of their moral status. 

In this chronically online age, we’re also under constant pressure to keep up with the litany of moral outrages that sweep social media. We’re exposed to moral crusaders touting their worldview, and many of us are quietly fearful of saying the wrong thing and attracting their – or their followers’ – ire. This drives us towards extremism and makes us less tolerant of different moral perspectives. 

Thankfully, the same mottos that guided the Greeks two and a half thousand years ago can bring wisdom to us today. “Know thyself” encourages us to understand and be critical of our own moral worldview, and appreciate that not everyone sees the world in the same way. “All things in moderation” invites us to find a middle path between the amoralist and the moral crusader (also, limit your time on social media). And “certainty leads to ruin” reminds us that it’s better to doubt something that’s true than it is to have absolute conviction in something that is false.  

Moral certainty might be natural, it might feel good, but if we don’t push back against it, it can turn us into the very monsters we ought to be battling against.

 

Explore the dangers of moral certainty in the session, Against Goodness with Jesse Bering, Joanna Bourke, Hanno Sauer and Sisonke Msimang on Sat 22 August at Festival of Dangerous Ideas. Tickets on sale now. 

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Focused young person in tan hoodie reads Tolerance is a Wasteland book at a market filled with stacks of dangerous reads

9 dangerous reads for Festival of Dangerous Ideas 2026

Visitor in a mustard sweater inspects a book at a bustling market display of dangerous reads for Festival of Ideas patrons

Failing nations. The rise of technocracies. Civility politics. Festival of Dangerous Ideas returns 20-30 August to Carriageworks, Sydney.

This year’s program asks hard questions about the hardest issues of our time. And the books behind those questions are the best way to do your homework.

Sydney’s most beloved booksellers, Gleebooks, are back with a cart stacked high with the world’s most dangerous titles at the Dangerous Books x Gleebooks pop up.

Here’s a sneak peek at nine new releases from this year’s line-up of thinkers, artists, experts and disruptors. You know, the books you need to buy before they are banned, burnt or redacted forever…


Heresies, Richard Flanagan

Heresies Occasional Pieces by Richard Flanagan features a dark ink blot on fire near a sketched figure in a dunce cap hatA collection of Flanagan’s essays, articles and speeches spanning two decades, moving from Manus Island and MONA to Indigenous Australia and the corrosion of democracy. Flanagan argues that a writer doing their job inevitably ends up saying the unsayable.

 

SESSION: HERESIES
Sat 22 Aug, 12:00pm // Carriageworks
Richard Flanagan
with Ann Mossop
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The Incredible Afterlives of Dr Stevenson, Jesse Bering

Book cover for The Incredible Afterlives of Dr Stevenson by Jesse Bering featuring a vintage street scene and a man readingA biography of psychiatrist Ian Stevenson, who spent four decades travelling the world investigating reincarnation, apparitions and near-death experiences. Bering traces the rise and fall of scientific parapsychology through Stevenson’s singular, controversial career.

 

SESSION: LIFE AFTER DEATH
Sun 23 Aug, 3:00pm // Carriageworks
Jesse Bering
with Fenella Kernebone
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Enshittification, Cory Doctorow

Book cover for Enshittification by Cory Doctorow featuring bold white text, blue subtitles, a poop emoji, and a guillotine.Doctorow’s diagnosis of why digital platforms decay: not the inevitable march of history, but specific, reversible policy choices that let tech giants lock users in, then squeeze them dry. Part road map, part disassembly manual for the internet’s problems.

 

SESSION: ENSHITTIFICATION
Sun 23 Aug, 12:00pm // Carriageworks
Cory Doctorow
with Kirsten Drysdale
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Political Girl: Life and Fate in Russia, Maria Alyokhina

Book cover for Political Girl by Maria Alyokhina showing pink and black halftone images of young woman and riot police gearPussy Riot member Maria Alyokhina’s diary-like account of activism, imprisonment and eventual escape from Russia between 2014 and 2022, told with dry wit and unflinching detail from prison cells to protest lines.

 

SESSION: PUSSY RIOT’S POLITICAL GIRL
Sun 23 Aug, 6:00pm // Carriageworks
Maria Alyokhina
with Eric J. Breitenbach
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How to Stand Up to a Dictator, Maria Ressa

Cover of Maria Ressa book How to Stand Up to a Dictator featuring her portrait against a blue toned urban cityscape backgroundNobel laureate and journalist Maria Ressa’s account of building the news site, Rappler while under sustained legal and online attack from the Duterte government, and her argument for defending truth as the frontline of democracy.

 

SESSION: WEAPONS OF MASS DISTRACTION
Sun 23 Aug, 4:00pm // Carriageworks
Maria Ressa
with Hamish Macdonald
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Screw Nice, Amy Remeikis

Vintage style illustration of a smiling woman on the cover of Screw Nice by Amy Remeikis with neon green text overlaysOn how demands for civility are used by the powerful to shut down dissent, arguing that when lies are treated as truth, politeness becomes a tool of control rather than a virtue.

 

SESSION: GOVERNING IN THE AGE OF STUPID
Sat 22 Aug, 10:00am // Carriageworks
Waleed Aly, Amy Remeikis, Greg Sheridan
with Hannah Ferguson
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You Must Take Part in Revolution, Badiucao & Melissa Chan

Graphic novel cover You Must Take Part In Revolution by Badiucao depicts hands holding flaming glass bottles against red fireA dystopian graphic novel set in 2035, following three friends from the 2019 Hong Kong protests as they take diverging paths through a near-future war between an authoritarian China and a fascist United States. The Dangerous Books x Gleebooks pop up at the Festival is the first place in Australia you can get your hands on this new title.

 

SESSION: YOU MUST TAKE PART IN REVOLUTION
Sat 22 Aug, 4:00pm // Carriageworks
Badiucao & Melissa Chain
with Dan Ilic
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Conspiracy Nation, Ariel Bogle

Book cover for Conspiracy Nation featuring a central eye icon enclosing a map of Australia, a UFO beam, and silhouettes.Co-written with Cam Wilson, an on-the-ground investigation into Australia’s conspiracy culture, from Port Arthur denialism to anti-vax movements, examining who is harmed by these ideas and why they take hold.


SESSION: TRUST ME, IT’S A CONSPIRACY
Sun 23 Aug, 2:30pm // Carriageworks
Ariel Bogle, Harry Hobbs, Anke Richter
with Patrick Stokes
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Going On and On: Why Longevity Threatens the Future, Lucinda Holdforth

Book cover for On and On by Lucinda Holdforth featuring repetitive text design and the subtitle Why our longevity threatensA provocative argument that society’s obsession with extending life, and the refusal of ageing leaders to relinquish power, is doing lasting damage to the economy, culture and prospects of younger generations.


SESSION: LONGEVITY THREATENS THE FUTURE
Sat 22 Aug, 3:00pm // Carriageworks
Lucinda Holdforth
with Waleed Aly & Scott Stephens
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These titles, plus more, will be available at the Dangerous Books x Gleebooks pop up across 22-23 August at Carriageworks, Sydney. Check out the full Festival program at festivalofdangerousideas.com